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I. INTRODUCTION 
Purchase money, as that odd phrase is used in Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), does not refer to "money" at all but 
to a type of loan-a loan that finances the purchase of the collateral 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
Thanks go to Robert Lloyd, Jeanne L. Schroeder, and Paul Shupack for the comments 
on earlier drafts. 
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that secures the loan. Article 9 treats purchase money security inter-
ests rather differently from other types-particularly with regard to 
their priority. 
Perhaps most significantly, the purchase money priority1 breaks 
the monopoly power an after-acquired property lender might have over 
the debtor. If a security interest automatically attaches to everything a 
debtor has, a supplier extending credit to the debtor without the bene-
fit of a purchase money status thereby makes a contribution to the 
welfare of this creditor. This is to say that the loan will not be forth-
coming, as charity is not a hallmark of trade credit-not intentionally 
so, anyway. If the debtor has no cash and nevertheless is in need of 
supplies, the purchase money priority makes provisioning the debtor 
possible over the opposition or indifference of the after-acquired prop-
erty lender, because the purchase money security interest has priority 
over the after-acquired property security interest.2 Often this is justi-
fied by the claim that the purchase money lender is the "founder of the 
feast" and simply deserves a higher priority than the after-acquired 
property lender for this broader reason. 3 Or the after-acquired prop-
1. A purchase money security interest is described in § 9-107, which provides: 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent 
that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part 
of its price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of 
collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
U.C.C. § 9-107 (1990) (hereinafter all references to the UCC are to the 1990 Official Text 
unless otherwise stated). For an account of the drafting history of§ 9-107, see D. Benja-
min Beard, The Purchase Money Security Interest in Inventory: If It Does Not Floa t , 
It Must Be Dead, 57 TENN. L. REv. 437, 473-79 (1990) . 
2. Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory Financing: The Case for Lim-
ited Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (1990). In the jargon of law-and-eco-
nomics, it is sometimes said that the after-acquired property lenders have the ability to 
extract economic rents from the debtor for new credit. The purchase money priority 
renders purchase money lenders competitive, thereby lowering interest rates for the 
debtor. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T . Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-73 (1979). 
3. Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing Purchase Money Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. 
REv. 1, 11 (1985) ("During the nineteenth century the purchase money superpriority was 
transformed from a formalistic concept . . . to an equitable concept in recognition of the 
inherent fairness of giving fir~t claim to the assets to those who parted with their money 
to make possible the assets' acquisition.") Professor Lloyd thinks that purchase money 
priority is a fairness concept that should be developed accordingly and that it is a mis-
take when judges revert back to the formal properties of purchase money priority to 
settle legal disputes. Id. 
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erty lender has a "stranglehold" over the debtor that ought to be 
broken.• 
Because purchase money priority has its relevance principally 
against after-acquired property liens, it appears quite late in the his-
tory of commercial liens on personal property, simply because the af-
ter-acquired property clause was vindicated only late in our history. 5 
Grant Gilmore traces it back to the revolution in financing created by 
the railroad boom of the Reconstruction era. Prior to that time, it had 
a venerable history in real property, largely because of two phenom-
ena-the judgment lien, which encumbered real estate as soon as the 
judgment was docketed, and dower, which immediately attached to 
land as soon as it was acquired by the husband.6 As a result, the meta-
physics of purchase money priority was already well known by the time 
security interests on personal property came into vogue. 
If the principal purpose of purchase money priority is to establish 
the primacy of the purchase money security interest over the security 
interest in after-acquired property, a second major purpose in state law 
is to relieve consumer lenders from filing a financing statement with 
regard to purchase money security interests in consumer goods.7 The 
reason usually given for this is ·quite practical-if every purchase 
money security interest in consumer goods were subject to a filing rule, 
the files would be clogged with unedifying financing statements to the 
point where the system might break down-and the very lives of the 
clerks might be at risk-under the crush of a paper avalanche. 
The automatic perfection of the purchase money security interest 
in consumer goods obviates the need to file as to either competing af-
ter-acquired property security interests or subsequently created prop-
erty interests. Similarly, loss of purchase money status implies that the 
security interest becomes unperfected, in the absence of a filing. Later 
we will see a great many cases in which exactly this catastrophe oc-
curred to secured parties for some real or imagined technical error. 
Besides the above two purposes in state law-priority against af-
ter-acquired property security interests and automatic perfection in 
4. In re Daniels, 35 B.R. 247, 249 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (Bohanon, J.) (herein-
after the reader should note the author's inclusion of the judge who authored each court 
decision); Beard, supra note 1, at 440; Lloyd, supra note 3, at 5, 74. 
5. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2. 
6. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 19-20. 
7. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). Prior to the 1972 amendments, a purchase money security 
interest in farm equipment having a purchase price of less than $2,500 also self-per-
fected. See U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(c) (1962) . The 1972 Review Committee believed that "the 
effect of the rule was to make farmers' equipment unavailable to them as collateral for 
loans from some lenders." U.C.C. § 9-302 Reasons for 1972 Change. · 
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consumer cases8-federal law makes purchase money priority impor-
tant. One of these federal rules is a regulation of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) under its powers under section 5 of the FTC Act.• 
According to this rule, lenders who take nonpurchase money security 
interests in certain household goods10 have committed an unfair trade 
practice within the meaning of section 5(a)(l). For this, the remedy is a 
cease-and-desist order issued by the FTC against the offending 
lender. 11 
Two federal bankruptcy provisions make purchase money status 
important. First, nonpurchase money security interests on certain 
kinds of exempt property are avoidable under section 522(f)(2),11 to 
the extent they impair exemptions. Purchase money secured parties 
are immune from this danger. 
Second, section lll0(a) provides that the automatic stay in chap-
ter 11 lapses after sixty days if a secured party claims a purchase 
money security interest in an airplane owned by a carrier with a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics 
8. Professor Robert Lloyd emphasizes a third: purchase money lenders were usu-
ally not subject to exemption laws. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 17-19; see Dominion Nat'!. 
Bank v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1984) (Sprouse, J.) (discussing Virginia exemp-
tion statute). This purchase money privilege, however, in no way depends on the 
purchase money lender having a security interest. Rather, it is an immunity against ex-
emptions that either general or secured creditors might enjoy. 
9. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1992) . 
10. Works of art, electronic equipment (except one television and one radio), jew-
elry (except wedding rings) , and items acquired as antiques are excepted from this regu-
lation. Id. § 444.l(i) . 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1988). For a description and a history of this FTC regula-
tion, see American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (Wald, J.) (upholding the institution of these regulations). 
12. According to § 522(0: 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fix-
ing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such 
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under 
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, ap-
pliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry 
that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use 
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; 
(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the 
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or 
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor. 
11 u.s.c. § 522(0 (1988). 
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Board. The only way a debtor can extend the automatic stay is to cure 
all past defaults and stay current on the relevant loan obligation. Non-
purchase money lenders have no comparable privilege. Therefore, if a 
purchase money security interest on a qualified13 airplane is trans-
formed in chapter 11, the automatic stay restrains the secured party 
even after sixty days. 
All of these purposes make the definition of purchase money im-
portant. Yet the definition supplied by Article 9 of the UCC is fraught 
with problems. And, if you haven't already guessed it, that is precisely 
the topic I wish to take up in this essay. 
I will limit my attention to the following four problems with the 
definition of purchase money. First, precisely what temporal attributes 
does a purchase money priority entail? Often it is said that purchase 
money priority is an exception to the rule of "first in time is first in 
right." I will show that the opposite is usually true. More fundamen-
tally, the purchase money security interest is coeval with or perhaps 
older than its competitor, the security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty. This fact has important implications for the filing rules that Arti-
cle 9 imposes on purchase money lenders. In fact, there is a good 
argument that the purchase money lender should not have to file at all 
to beat out the morally questionable, barely legitimate security interest 
in after-acquired property.14 
Second, following the lead of Dean Gerald McLaughlin, who wrote 
the leading statement on the question, I will examine whether the 
purchase money priority extends beyond the pure advance of purchase 
money into such items as debt service, collection expenses, and the 
like. In the course of doing so, I will point out some flaws in the literal 
language of the UCC. Ordinarily we can ignore such trivia, as the aver-
sion of judges to absurd results usually suffices to protect us from the 
chaos inflicted by the literal meaning of statutes. But in this era when 
plain meaning dictators threaten to seize control of the Supreme 
Court, the drafters of the new Article 9 had better pay attention to 
their grammar, if they wish to save us from the bother of irrational 
13. Not all airborne collateral is covered by§ lllO(a). Rather, the airplane must be 
owned by "an air carrier operating under a certificate of convenience and necessity is-
sued by the Civil Aeronautics Board, or a water carrier that holds a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity or permit issued by the Interstate Commerce Commissio•n . . . 
. " At least one court has held that licenses from the Department of Commerce are good 
enough to trigger section lllO(a) rights. In re Express Air, Inc., 136 B.R. 328, 330-31 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Hillman, J.). 
14. The after-acquired property has been called "a somewhat refined sort of peon-
age." Beard, supra note 1, at 465, citing Neil Cohen & Michael Gerber, The After-Ac-
quired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 647 (1939). 
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commercial law decisions. They must speak by the card, or equivoca-
tion will undo them.10 
Third, I will examine the question of purity and pollution in 
purchase money priority-whether extra nonpurchase money collateral 
or nonpurchase money advances should destroy purchase money prior-
ity altogether, as a kind of anti-miscegenation penalty, or whether a 
"dual status" marriage will be tolerated, so that a secured party can 
hold purchase money and purchase money security interests simulta-
neously. As this is the topic of a truly masterful article by Professor 
Robert M. Lloyd, neither I nor anyone else could hope to improve on 
his study very much. Nevertheless, I will humbly summarize his find-
ings and refine his conclusions wherever I can. As the question of 
transformation or dual status is vital for consumer and airline bank-
ruptcies, I wish to pay special attention to whether Article 9 is compe-
tent to preempt the definition of purchase money priority, or whether 
federal bankruptcy courts are obliged to develop, at least in part, a 
federal definition that outranks whatever the UCC might presume to 
contribute. 
Finally, I will conclude with comments on refinanced purchase 
money security interests-also a topic that Professor Lloyd takes up. 
Refinancings are conceptually different from transformation rule cases, 
as they turn on whether the parties intend to terminate a preexisting 
purchase money priority. The transformation rule, on the other hand, 
applies regardless of the intent the secured party may have entertained 
toward her own purchase money priority. 
We turn first, then, to the temporality of purchase money security 
interests and what lessons can be derived from temporality for the gov-
ernance of the superpriority. 
II. THE TEMPORALITY OF THE PURCHASE MONEY 
SECURITY INTEREST 
0 tempore! 0 mores! 
-Tully 
It is usually said-erroneously-that purchase money priority vio-
lates the rule of "first in right is first in time."18 But this is not neces-
15. "How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or equivocation will 
undo us."-Hamlet to Horatio on the Grave Diggers. William Shakespeare, Hamlet. 
16. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1144 ("The overriding priority afforded 
purchase money lenders occupies an especially important place in the Article 9 scheme 
because it constitutes an exception to the general rule that competing security interests 
are to be ranked temporally, with earlier interests prevailing over later ones."); Gerald T. 
McLaughlin, "Add On" Clauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much 
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sarily true. Typically, purchase money priority is entirely consistent 
with this rule. To explore the temporality of the purchase money se-
curity interest, it will be useful to divide them into two types: the con-
ditional sale and the enabling loan. The conditional sale refers to 
purchase money security interests in which the seller or the item sup-
plies the credit, retaining or receiving a security interest for the price 
of the item sold. The term "conditional sale" recalls the ancestor of 
this kind of purchase money security interest.17 This type of security 
interest is the one described in section 9-107(a). 18 
The "enabling loan" is the purchase money security interest de-
scribed in section 9-107(b). 19 In the enabling loan, the lender provides 
credit so that the borrower can buy the item from the seller for cash. 
of a Good Thing, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 661-62 (1981) ("If one of the secured credi-
tors claims a purchase money security interest, however, the 'first-in-time' rule of prior-
ity is reversed; a 'second-in-time' purchase money security interest will normally outrank 
a competing 'first-in-time' security interest.") (footnotes omitted); Bernard A. Burk, 
Note, Preserving the Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase 
Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1154 (1983) ("The PMSI, however, abruptly departs 
from the first-in-time rule."); Lynda Kay Chandler, Note, Preserving Purchase Money 
Security Interests and Allocating Payments, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REP. 849, 851 (1987) ("In 
general, the first security interest perfected has priority under the first-in -time, first-in-
right rule. The U.C.C. makes an exception to this rule for a PMSI.") (footnotes omitted) 
[hereafter cited as Michigan Note]. 
17. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 671. In the conditional sale, the buyer suppos-
edly did not get title to the item bought until the last dollar of the price had been paid. 
Until then the seller was the owner. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act legislated the 
rule that if the seller ever repossessed the item because of a default in payment, the 
seller had to resell the item and return the surplus to the debtor. UNIF. CONDITIONAL 
SALES ACT § 18 (1918). After that, the concept of title became irrelevant, and was dis-
placed with the generic security interest of Article 9. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 25-26. 
18. According to § 9-107(a): 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent 
that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part 
of its price . . .. 
U.C.C. § 9-107(a). 
19. According to § 9-107(b): 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent 
that it is 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of 
collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
U.C.C. § 9-107(b). 
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A. The Conditional Sale 
It is very easy to conceive of the conditional sale as an example of 
"first in time is first in right," rather than as an exception to it. One 
may conceive of the conditional sale security interest as a retained 
property interest.20 So conceived, its age antecedes attachment of the 
security interest itself. That is, the seller conveys only the equity to the 
debtor, and retains the rest. On this view, the competing after-acquired 
property is actually second in time, because the retained purchase 
money security interest is older. 
Alternatively, it is possible to conceive of the conditional sale dif-
ferently; the sale wipes out the seller's property interest entirely, and 
the debtor conveys back a newly created purchase money security in-
terest. So conceived, the purchase money security interest attaches si-
multaneously with the after-acquired property interest. Neither exists 
until the debtor has rights in the collateral. Neither is prior in time 
compared to the other. Both security interests came into existence at 
precisely the same moment. 21 
In either case, the conditional sale is either an example of the rule 
of "first in time is first in right," or it is a case of simultaneously at-
tached liens. Subject to the exception developed below, it is incorrect 
to characterize the conditional sale as violative of the rule of "first in 
time is first in right." 
A purchase money security interest is not generally later in time 
than the after-acquired property security interest, in terms of attach-
ment. Usually, commentators who say that the purchase money prior-
ity is an exception to the rule of "first in time" are thinking of filing a 
financing statement.22 It is normal for an after-acquired property 
lender to file first before a purchase money lender. Yet the purchase 
money secured party still wins priority. Filing, though, is not creation 
(i.e., attachment) of a lien, or even perfection. Rather, perfection is 
carefully defined as a combination of filing and attachment.23 If one 
attends to this technical definition, one can see that, at least when fil-
ing occurs in advance of attachment, an after-acquired property secur-
ity interest and a purchase money security interest are perfected at 
20. Section 9-107(a) hedges its bets and refers to a conditional sale as being either 
"taken or retained." 
21. See David Gray Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Ac-
quired Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 515-17 (1985). · 
22. Nathaniel Hansford, The Purchase Money Security Interest in Inventory Ver-
sus the After-Acquired Property Interest-A "No Win" Situation, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 
235, 238 (1986). 
23. u.c.c. § 9-303(1). 
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precisely the same time-when the debtor first gets rights to the 
collateral. 
B. The Enabling Loan 
Similarly, the enabling loan is also at least consistent with "first in 
time is first in right." When the purchase money security interest is an 
enabling loan, the purchase money lender obtains a security interest 
precisely at the same time as the after-acquired property lender-when 
the debtor first obtains rights in the collateral. In such a case, Article 9 
breaks a tie when it awards priority to the purchase money lender, but 
it does not violate the rule of first in time is first in right. 34 
C. The Exception That Proves the Rule 
Purchase money loans are usually simultaneous with after-ac-
quired property liens (or older, in the case of a retained conditional 
sale interest). Nevertheless, it is not impossible that a purchase money 
security interest might be younger than an after-acquired property se-
curity interest. Such a purchase money security interest still beats out 
to the after-acquired property security interest. When this occurs, the 
purchase money priority does indeed violate the rule of "first in time is 
first in right." 
Whatever else section 9-107 may require, it does not require that 
the security agreement be signed before the debtor obtains the collat-
eral.25 A signed security agreement is one of the elements of attach-
24. In the case of a tie, the common law tried mightily to reconcile purchase money 
priority with the rule of "first in time is first in right." Historians often cite Nash v. 
Preston, 79 Eng. Rep. 767 (K.B. 1631), as the original purchase money priority case. 
Lloyd, supra note 3, at 11. In this case, _ a husband bought land subject to a purchase 
money mortgage. He died, and the widow claimed dower over the land, free and clear of 
the mortgage. In this case, the wife's dower claim is the equivalent of an after-acquired 
property security interest. The court held that the dower right could not attach because 
the husband's title "is in and out of him quasi uno fiatu [like a breath), and by one and 
the same act." This so-called doctrine of instantaneous seisin would appear by its origin 
to be a principle of flatulence. For a more modern formulation, see Chase Nat. Bank v. 
Sweezy, 281 N.Y.S. 487, 492 (1931) (Callahan, J.), aff'd, 236 A.O. 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1932), aff'd, 185 N.E. 803 (N.Y. 1933) ("The theory is that title does not rest in the 
vendee for a single moment, but merely passes through the latter to vest in the mortga-
gee, without stopping beneficially in the purchaser, and that during such instantaneous 
passage the prior lien cannot attach to the title.") 
25. In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code would punish a purchase money lender who 
obtains a signed security agreement after the debtor has received collateral. Section 
547(c)(3) is designed to preserve the enabling loan from avoidance as a voidable prefer-
ence. According to § 547(c)(3), the trustee cannot avoid a security interest: 
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
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ment.28 Therefore, the debtor could obtain the collateral before the 
purchase money lender's security interest attaches. By this time, the 
after-acquired property lender will already have an attached security 
interest. Later, when the purchase money agreement is formalized in 
writing, the purchase money lender's security interest · will at-
tach-second in time. Yet the second security interest still has the 
purchase money priority and therefore beats out the after-acquired 
property security interest, if the lender perfects in time.27 
This exception refutes Official Comment 2 to section 9-107, a com-
ment that has influenced law making with regard to purchase money 
priority.28 According to Comment 2: 
When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured 
party who is not a seller, he must of course have given present 
consideration. This section therefore provides that the 
purchase money party must be one who gives value "by making 
advances or incurring an obligation": the quoted language ex-
cludes from the purchase money category any security interest 
taken as security for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or 
antecedent debt. 
In the counter-example just given, purchase money was advanced and 
used to obtain collateral, but the execution of the security agreement 
was delayed. Hence, the purchase money security interest became "se-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that 
was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that 
contains a description of such property as collateral; 
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such 
agreement; 
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and 
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and 
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives 
possession of such property . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988). If the debtor has obtained the collateral before a security 
agreement was signed, then the secured party gave value before the signing of the secur-
ity agreement, so that she cannot comply with § 547(c)(A)(i). 
26. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a). 
27. That is, within ten days of the debtor receiving possession of the collateral, in 
noninventory cases, U.C.C. § 9-312(4), or before the debtor receives possession of inven-
tory (together with a letter to the after-acquired property inventory lender) . Id. § 9-
312(3). In real estate cases, where the collateral becomes a fixture, the grace period starts 
to run against the mortgagee or other "encumbrancer" when the collateral is affixed to 
the real estate. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a). Of course, purchase money security interests in con-
sumer goods are deemed automaticallY, perfected. Id. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 92-102. 
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curity for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt." 
Therefore, the comment is wrong and ought to be ignored. 
The exception just described-grant of a purchase money security 
interest after the debtor already has rights in the collateral-is cer-
tainly avoidable, because the UCC facilitates pre-loan closings by al-
lowing secured parties to file their financing statements in advance of 
the loan. In real estate cases, many courts required that a mortgage 
deed is effective only if the debtor already owned the premises at the 
time of the deed. For the purchase money mortgagee, this meant that 
first the seller deeded the land to the buyer and then the buyer deeded 
the mortgage to the lender. This requirement virtually required the 
temporal subordination of the purchase money mortgage to what~ver 
after-acquired property interest the mortgagee had to compete with. 
This embarrassment, however, was simply ignored, as courts de-
clared purchase money mortgages to be senior, regardless of this tem-
poral detail. Therefore, what is an exotic variation in UCC transactions 
was routine in real estate deals, yet courts did not hesitate to favor the 
purchase money priority.29 
D. Purchase Money Security Interests That Are First In Time 
Purchase money security interests take priority over after-ac-
quired property security interests, and this usually implies simultane-
ous creation of the two competing liens-though not always. We have 
seen that conditional sales can be conceived as being older than com-
peting after-acquired property liens. In addition, because section 9-
107(a) does not require a security agreement before the purchase 
money advance, a purchase money security interest can indeed be sec-
ond in time and still prevail over the after-acquired property security 
interest. 
Of course, they also compete with security interests and liens that 
are subsequently created. For example, the debtor may give A a 
purchase money security interest in a piece of equipment and, subse-
quently may give B a security interest in the same equipment. Usually, 
this contest is ·decided in the ordinary way-the first to perfect or file 
wins under section 9-312(5)(a). Ordinarily, the purchase money priority 
is entirely irrelevant to this contest. But there is one circumstance in 
which the purchase money priority might still be relevant to such a 
contest. If a second security interest or judicial lien attaches to the 
collateral within ten days of the debtor receiving collateral, and if the 
purchase money security interest is unperfected, the purchase money 
29. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
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security interest might still have priority if the secured party perfects 
within the ten day grace period provided in section 9-312(4) or section 
9-301(2). Nothing in this grace period limits its effect to after-acquired 
property security interests. Therefore, the purchase money priority is 
useful to defeat not only after-acquired property security interests but 
also some subsequently created security interests as well. 
E. Filing 
It is a ciiche that purchase money security interests are favored in 
Article 9, but this is not entirely true. Putting aside consumer goods 
for the moment,30 purchase money security interests are given priority 
over competing security interests in after-acquired property, but only 
if the purchase money lender files a financing statement by some dead-
line. With regard to purchase money security interests in inventory, 
the secured party must file before the debtor receives the goods and, in 
addition to filing a financing statement, the secured party must send a 
billet doux to the after-acquired property lender informing her of the 
impending influx of purchase money collateral. 31 
30. Purchase money security interests in consumer goods are deemed automatically 
perfected, against most lien creditors and buyers. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d); but see § 9-307(2) 
(consumer buyers take free of these purchase money security interests unless the lender 
has filed a financing statement). 
31. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). This section provides: 
A perfected security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting 
security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable cash 
proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if 
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the 
debtor receives possession of the inventory; and 
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing 
to the holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a 
financing statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the 
date of the filing made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) 
before the beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase money 
security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession 
(subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and 
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notifi-
cation within five years before the debtor receives possession of the in-
ventory; and 
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or 
expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of 
the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type. 
U.C.C. § 9-312(3). For a case interpreting the adequacy of the notice sent to the after-
acquired property lender, see In re Daniels, 35 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (Boha-
non, J.) (letter failing to mention purchase money status of new security interests still 
good enough to put sophisticated after-acquired property lender on notice). 
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With regard to goods other than inventory or consumer goods, the 
secured party must file within ten days of the debtor's receiving pos-
session of the goods. Meanwhile, in order to beat a lien creditor as to 
any kind of nonconsumer property-inventory or otherwise-the 
purchase money lender must file within ten days of receiving posses-
sion of the collateral. 
These rules actually prejudice a secured party, compared to 
precode law. Prior to the UCC, a conditional seller had to perfect in 
order to beat a subsequent secured party, but no filing was required for 
the purchase money priority to have its primary effect-the priming of 
the simultaneously created after-acquired property lien.31 According to 
the Supreme Court: 
A mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property can only 
attach itself to such property in the condition in which it 
comes into the mortgagor's hands. If that property is already 
subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does 
not displace them, though they may be junior to it in point of 
time. It only attaches to such interest as the mortgagor ac-
quires; and if he purchase property and give a mortgage for the 
purchase-money, the deed which he receives and the mortgage 
which he gives are regarded as one transaction, and no general 
lien impending over him, whether in the shape of a general 
mortgage, or judgment, · or recognizance, can displace such 
mortgage for purchase-money. And in such cases a failure to 
register the mortgage for purchase-money makes no differ-
ence. It does not come within the reason of the registry laws. 
These laws are intended for the protection of subsequent, not 
prior, purchasers and creditors.33 
The idea-at least with regard to conditional sales-is that the secured 
party retains a security interest in the collateral and transfers only the 
equity to the debtor. To this equity attaches the after-acquired prop-
erty lien; the earlier unperfected security interest is simply never 
touched by the after-acquired property lien. 
32. Professor Lloyd states " (p)re-UCC law generally subjected purchase money 
mortgages to the operation of the recording laws," Lloyd, supra note 3, at 39, but for this 
proposition he cites only cases in which subsequent judicial lien creditors or bankruptcy 
trustees took priority over an unperfected purchase money security interest. But see 
UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 5. See also Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'! Bank, 364 U.S. 
603 (1961) (describing Michigan's precode grace period of fourteen days). 
33. United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. 362, 365 (1870) (Bradley, J.) (em-
phasis added). 
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A case illustrating this is Robinson v. Wright, 84 where a judgment 
creditor served an execution on Sheriff Robinson on February 2, 1928. 
The execution created a judicial lien on all property that the debtor 
then owned or thereafter acquired. On March 22, Wright sold the 
debtor a car and (as a back-up) a team of mules. The sale was on 
credit, with Wright reserving for himself a purchase money chattel 
mortgage. On April 10, Wright perfected his chattel mortgage by filing 
the requisite financing statement, and on April 14, Sheriff Robinson 
levied the car and the mules. Wright sued Robinson to recover posses-
sion of the collateral. In such a case, the court had no trouble ruling 
that Wright's security interest prevailed over the after-acquired prop-
erty lien, even though Wright delayed perfection by almost a month.a11 
These rationales happened to deal with conditional sales, where it 
is possible to say that the purchase money security interest is older 
than the competing after-acquired property lien. Such cases appear to 
be nothing but the rule of "first in time is first in right." But, of course, 
purchase money security interests also include enabling loans, where 
the enabling lender's security interest is created at precisely the same 
time as the after-acquired property security interest. In such a case, 
the rationale for protecting the purchase money security interest must 
be different from the intuitions of "first in time is first in right." 
There is a good argument that a purchase money lender should 
not have to file a financing statement at all, with regard to an after-
acquired property lender, as precode authorities intuited. There is no 
compelling reliance argument that the after-acquired property lender 
can make-at least when goods other than inventory is involved. In 
fact, this instinct was followed in International Harvester Credit Corp. 
v. American National Bank of Jacksonville.as In this case, a purchase 
money secured party who did not file nevertheless prevailed over an 
after-acquired property security interest, to the general dismay of the 
commentators.37 According to Justice Dekle, "it would be an invidious 
preference to the earlier creditor-bank without so much as a showing 
34. 9 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1932) (Butler, J.). 
35. "Even if the property comes into the hands of the mortgagor subject to a lien 
which is good against him, though for want of formalities it is not good against his subse-
quently attaching creditors and third persons, it is nevertheless prior to the lien of a 
mortgage under an after-acquired property clause." Id. at 620. 
36. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974), noted in 3 Fu. ST. U. L. REV. 150 (1975). 
37. Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The "Overloaded" PMS/ in Bankruptcy: A Problem 
in Search of a Resolution, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 1, 17-18 (1987) ("failed to follow the plain 
meaning of the Code") ; Donald Francis Sinex, Comment, Purchase Money Security In-
terest Priority Under § 9-312(4) of the U.C.C.: Florida Supreme Court Rewrites the 
Code, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 384, 387 (1975) ("misconstrued section 9-312(4)"). 
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that there was a compelling public interest or purpose served by such 
arbitrary requirement of outright priority to the earlier creditor in the 
total after-acquired property."88 Any other result, he thought, "would 
be abhorrent to equity and justice," a case of "unjust enrichment."39 
Overlooking the merits of these observations, the Florida legisla-
ture amended Florida's version of UCC section 9-312(3) (pertaining to 
inventory) by adding this sentence: "If any of the foregoing ... re-
quirements are not met, the priority of the purchase money security 
interest shall be determined under subsection (5)."40 A similar sentence 
was added to section 9-312(4) as well.41 These sentences were designed 
to force the courts to move onto the "first to file or perfect" rule, if the 
purchase money secured party had not perfected in time against the 
after-acquired property lender. Under this latter rule, the purchase 
money secured party was probably doomed to lose. 
Subsequent to this legislation, a purchase money secured party 
who failed to file still demanded priority over an after-acquired prop-
erty lender. Though clearly sympathetic, the Florida Supreme Court 
had to eat crow: "Accordingly, we now recede from International Har-
vester. Pursuant to the Code, when the buyer takes possession of prop-
erty under a credit sales contract, he acquires the property, not merely 
an equity interest in the property. The seller retains only a security 
interest in the property."0 
Even if it is true that a purchase money secured party should not 
have to file against an after-acquired property security interest, there 
are two other important points to be made. First, it should still be the 
case that the purchase money secured party should have to perfect 
against any subsequently created security interest, judicial lien or 
purchase. Whatever rationales for the perfection requirement that ex-
ist will exist with regard to purchase money collateral when a subse-
quent purchaser or lien creditor contests priority. 
38. lnternaiional Harvester, 296 So. 2d at 34. 
39. Id. 
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.312(3) (West 1990). 
41. Id. ch. 679.312(4) ("Failure to so perfect shall cause the priority of the purchase 
money security interest to be determined under subsection (5)"). 
42. ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Regan, 487 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1986) (Overton, J .) (cita-
tions omitted). Chief Justice Boyd dissented, however. A sentence in the after-acquired 
property lender's security agreement stated that the lender only claimed "all of the right, 
title and interest of the mortgagor in any such personal property or fixtures subject to a 
conditional sale contract, chattel mortgage or similar lien or claim." Id. at 1050. This 
sentence, Boyd thought, meant that the after-acquired property claimed only the debtor 
equity and nothing more, which should have preserved the priority of the unperfected 
purchase money secured party. Id. at 1050-51. 
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Second, with regard to inventory, the current rules are justified by 
the supposition that the after-acquired property lender decides 
whether to foreclose on existing collateral or whether to advance new 
funds depending on whether an adequate equity cus_hion exists on in-
ventory currently in the possession· of the debtor.43 This justification 
amounts to a reliance argument in favor of the after-acquired property 
lender, thereby making inventory cases different from other kinds of 
after-acquired property cases, where reliance probably plays no role. 
Therefore, even if filing ought not to be necessary as against other 
kinds of after-acquired property security interests, it should continue 
to be the case that a purchase money lender supplying or enabling the 
acquisition of inventory should have to send the letter currently re-
quired by section 9-312(3) to the after-acquired property lender. 
III. DEFINITION OF PURCHASE MONEY 
Case law has revealed that the. current definition of "purchase 
money" is fraught with problems. According to UCC section 9-107: 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" 
to the extent that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral 
to secure all or part of its price; or 
(b)taken by a person who by making advances or 
incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor 
to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value 
is in fact so used. 
The first problem with this definition is that the conditional sale is 
defined with respect to "price," but the enabling loan is not. This has 
given rise to questions regarding items that are not advances, strictly 
speaking. For example, a purchase money secured party may incur col-
lection costs and attorneys' fees. Security agreements usually permit 
the secured party to add to the secured claim against the debtor. Will 
such costs be considered the "price" of the item? 
The second problem is that the enabling loan does not refer to 
price but to the status of a person who makes a purchase money ad-
vanced. This reference to the status of the person suggests that secur-
ity interests taken by such a person for other things could obtain a 
purchase money priority. For example, the enabling lender should have 
no trouble bringing in her attorneys' fees, even as the conditional seller 
must struggle with the definition of "price." But it also suggests that 
43. U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 3; see also Beard, supra note 1, at 461-62, 486. 
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any security interest taken by such a person might have purchase 
money priority, because the definition, on this reading, is no longer 
tied to the purchase money advance itself. 
A. The Definition of Price 
According to section 9-107(a), a conditional sale is a security inter-
est "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part 
of its price." The meaning of these words is apparently that only "the 
price" is eligible for the purchase money priority. 
What constitutes "the price" of an item is not specifically defined 
by Article 9.4• Besides the "list price," two items have been endorsed 
as properly part of "price." One is any sales tax connected with the 
purchased item. The second is the finance charge. The finance 
charge-interest-is the difference between the cash price of the item 
and the price over time.411 Dean Gerald McLaughlin points out that, at 
two places, Article 9 refers to "cash price" to refer to price minus inter-
est.46 This in turn implies that the unadorned "price" of section 9-
107(a) must include debt service.47 Hence, there seems little disagree-
ment that "its price" includes the concept of interest compensation.48 
44. On the broad definition of "price" in precode law, see McLaughlin, supra note 
16, at 672-73. Dean McLaughlin points out that, in precode law, the priority against 
after-acquired property secured creditors was rare, because the after-acquired property 
clause was not widely recognized. Instead, the typical dispute on the scope of the condi-
tional sale security interest prior to the UCC involved the bankruptcy trustee against the 
conditional seller. If the conditional seller's security interest was not part of the condi-
tional sales interest, then it was not a perfected security interest at all, because no chat-
tel mortgage filing had occurred. Therefore, the courts were liberal in defending the 
secured creditor against the bankruptcy trustee. These precedents, McLaughlin warns, 
are not trustworthy in the context of Article 9, where a security interest that is not 
purchase money might still be perfected, even as it loses priority to the after-acquired 
property secured party. 
45. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at. 665-70. 
46. The first of these provisions is § 9-505(1). According to this section, if a con-
sumer debtor has paid sixty percent of the "cash price" of purchase money collateral, she 
may sue the repossessing secured party for conversion if the secured party has not sold 
the collateral within ninety days. 
Section '9-507(1) also uses the term "cash price." According to this provision, a se-
cured party who has misbehaved after repossessing consumer goods must return all debt 
service to the consumer debtor, plus ten percent of the "cash price." 
47. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 666; see Meadows v. Household Retail Servs., 
Inc. (/n re Griffin), 9 B.R. 880, 881-82 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Drake, J.) (including 
finance charges and insurance) . 
48. See Stanford Note, supra note 16, at 1178 (interest compensation necessary 
and, "[a]ccordingly, finance charges are always considered part of an original purchase 
money debt .... "). 
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1. Collection Costs 
Harder to bring into the concept of price is collection expenses 
and the attorneys' fees connected with enforcing the purchase money 
security interest. Indeed, let's face it. The task is impossible. 
When Article 9 foreclosure proceedings are at stake, this omission 
is substantially mitigated by section 9-504(1)(a). This provision gives 
the purchase money lender priority for "the reasonable expenses of re-
taking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like 
and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by 
law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the 
secured party." This priority is structured so that, if a foreclosure actu-
ally occurs, the purchase money lender would have priority for these 
expenses over her own purchase money claim, which is recompensed 
only under section 9-504(1)(b). But, more important, she has priority 
over the security interests of competing after-acquired property lend-
ers as well, whose priority_ is described in section 9-504(1)(c). Thus, 
when a foreclosure sale is conducted by the purchase money secured 
party, the relevant expenses will be compensated as if the expenses 
had a priority that is even better than the purchase money priority. 
But suppose, as is very likely, that there is no foreclosure sale, be-
cause the debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition in federal court. If this 
occurs, section 9-504(1) has no application. The question then arises 
whether these enforcement expenses are part of the purchase money 
priority. 
To some extent, this question is mitigated by the presence of sec-
tion 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides: 
To the extent -that an allowed secured claim is secured by 
property the value of which, after any recovery under subsec-
tion (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such 
claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, inter-
est on 11uch claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges 
provided for under the agreement under which such claim 
arose.49 
Under this provision, an oversecured purchase money lender can re-
cover collection costs or postpetition interest, to the extent of the eq-
uity cushion she enjoys in the collateral. Undersecured parties are out 
of luck, but this simply replicates her predicament under state law, 
where, if the collateral runs out, section 9-504(1)(a) or a purchase 
49. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). 
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money priority will no more produce a recovery of collection expenses 
than would section 506(b). 
Now suppose a modest surplus exists. Section 506(b) gives priority 
to the purchase money lender for collection expenses to the extent of 
the collateral, even if there exists a junior after-acquired property se-
curity interest. If the junior secured party is harmed, the junior se-
cured party is entitled to adequate protection for the loss. That is, the 
bankruptcy trustee must transfer unencumbered assets to the junior 
secured party to make up the loss (or pay off the senior secured party 
so that the junior secured party is unharmed).00 
Suppose, however, that the junior secured party is an after-ac-
quired property secured party, claiming that the collateral costs are 
not part of the "price" as that word is used in section 9-107(a). This 
argument, if accepted, implies that the purchase money lender has a 
first security interest for the purchase money advance and a third se-
curity interest for the collection expenses. Should section 506(b) over-
ride this state-law priority and associate the collection expenses with 
the purchase money priority? This seems to be the literal meaning of 
section 506(b). If so, then perhaps federal law effectively expands the 
definition of "price" to include collection expenses and postpetition 
interest. 
There is one circumstance under state law in which we still want 
to know whether collection expenses are part of the purchase money 
priority. Suppose that the junior after-acquired property lender holds a 
junior foreclosure sale and finds a buyer. Under section 9-504(4): 
"When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights 
therein, discharges the security interest under which it is made and 
any security interest or lien subordinate thereto." Under this rule, the 
buyer at the junior foreclosure sale takes subject to senior purchase 
money security interest, but she takes free of any junior security inter-
est. Now it becomes necessary to know whether the purchase money 
lender's claim for attorneys' fees and collection costs are part of the 
senior purchase money priority that survives the sale or part of a jun-
ior security interest that gets wiped out. If the latter is true, then the 
junior secured party holding the sale is entitled to take cash proceeds 
ahead of the junior security interest for the purchase money lender's 
collection costs. 61 
50. David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 650-52 (1989). 
51. This example disproves Dean McLaughlin 's maxim that "the expenses of re-
possession and attorney's fees, although technically not included in purchase money 
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2. Future Advances 
Dean Gerald McLaughlin aggressively argues that any future ad-
vance used to repair or maintain the purchase money collateral should 
be added to the purchase money collateral, even though such future 
advances are clearly not "the price" of the purchase money collateral. 
His argument is that under section 9-207(2) a pledgee in possession of 
collateral may spend to preserve the collateral and may add the 
amount spent to the amount of the secured loan. This can be done 
even in the absence of the debtor's consent.02 Now if a pledgee were to 
be a purchase money lender-not an impossibility-nothing in section 
9-207(2) specifies that the expense would be entitled to a purchase 
money priority. This question could only be settled by an interpreta-
tion of section 9-107(a)-the very question Dean McLaughlin is trying 
to answer. 
This circularity aside, Dean McLaughlin thinks that section 9-
207 (2) means that nonpledgees who make similar expenditures can also 
add these expenses to the secured debt in the absence of agree-
ment53-a questionable premise-but he goes on to suggest that these 
added expenses would be entitled to purchase money priority. Accord-
ing to McLaughlin: "[B]ecause the Code automatically includes these 
payments in secured debt, these payments should automatically as-
sume the character of the secured debt. If the secured debt is purchase 
money debt, these payments should become part of that purchase 
money debt."54 Unhappily, these remarks are a non sequitur mounted 
precariously on another non sequitur. A future advance to the debtor is 
a secured advance only if the security agreement says so. According to 
section 9-204(3), "[o]bligations covered by a security agreement may 
include future advances or other value .... " Yet McLaughlin suggests 
that advances used to spruce up collateral are always to be added to 
the secured claim, whether an agreement provides for this or not. The 
reason: pledgees may add their own collateral preservation expenses to 
the secured debt. But there is a difference between pledgees and non-
possessory secured parties. The former are in control of the collateral 
and spend their own money in aid of the collateral directly. Secured 
parties out of possession are not in control of the collateral and need 
the debtor's consent to maintain or repair the collateral. In the absence 
debt, should be treated as if included in purchase money debt for the purposes of prior-
ity." McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 677. 
52. Provided, of course, that the security agreement does not expressly bar this 
behavior. 
53. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 674. 
54. Id. at 674-75. 
1992-93] PURCHASE MONEY 813 
of an agreement it is hard to see why the secured party is entitled to 
assume that the future advance is part of the secured claim over the 
opposition of the debtor. And even if future advances could be jammed 
into the secured claim over the opposition of the debtor, it does not 
follow that these nonconsensual secured advancesaa should have a 
purchase money priority. 
Now it might be said that any lender whose loan increases the 
value of the debtor's estate should be entitled to priority. over the ear-
lier secured parties. The increased value is otherwise a windfall to the 
earlier secured parties, who contributed nothing to it. Indeed, statutory 
liens usually add this value and are accorded a supervenient priority 
over old security interests.118 In admiralty, the rule of "last in time is 
first in right" is entirely based on this insight. 57 Although this insight is 
a good idea,58 it is not the idea Article 9 follows. Therefore, even if any 
ordinary advance increases the value of collateral, it by no means fol-
lows that the advance, for that reason, is entitled to purchase money 
priority. 
3. Advances in General 
As the above discussion indicates, a great many round pegs must 
be forced into square holes in order to bring incidentals like debt ser-
vice and collection costs into the concept of purchase money. In fact, 
the problem stems from a broader conceptual failing of the drafters of 
the UCC-an assumption that "advances" do not encompass all forms 
55. That is, the advance is voluntarily accepted, but their secured status is opposed 
by the debtor. 
56. UCC § 9-310 provides: 
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or 
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods 
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materi-
als or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is 
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise. 
U.C.C. § 9-310. See also id. cmt. 1 (purpose is to "provide that liens securing claims 
arising from work intended to enhance or preserve the value of the collateral take prior-
ity over an earlier security interest even though perfected"). 
57. The usual justification for maritime liens is that these liens add value to the 
vessel, which needs to be a floating source of credit as it moves from port to port. This 
priority scheme always guarantees that the captain may offer the boat as collateral for 
any new services done. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMI-
RALTY 742-44 (2d ed. 1975). 
58. It is invoked by Dean McLaughlin in defense of his extravagant reading of § 9-
207. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 675 (unless a purchase money secured party knows in 
advance she can advance new funds for repair of collateral, she is less likely to extend 
purchase money priority in the first place). 
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of "value." Because the drafters conflated "advances" and "value," sev-
eral priority rules in the UCC are ambiguous. 
This is not the case with the most salient priority rule in the 
UCC-that between competing nonpurchase money secured parties. 
Secured parties are governed by the "first to perfect or file" rule. Here 
priority can be secured without any reference to "attachment" at all. It 
is sufficient for a secured party to be the first to file, even though filing 
is not perfecting because some elements of attachment are missing. If 
the secured party is the first to file, all subsequent advances and other 
incidentals become part of the senior secured claim. 
On the other hand, when a priority rule turns on when an advance 
is given, an ambiguity arises with respect to elements of value that are 
not advances. For example, secured parties have priority over lien 
creditors only for their future advances. According to UCC section 9-
301(4): 
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security in-
terest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to 
the extent that it secures advances made before he becomes a 
lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without 
knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered 
into without knowledge of the lien. 09 
Suppose, for example, that SP who has advanced $50 claims a senior 
perfected security interest on collateral worth $80. Thereafter, LC be-
comes a lien creditor and encumbers the debtor equity.80 Once the ju-
dicial lien attaches, SP can make some senior future advances, but it is 
far from clear that senior collection expenses or debt service are senior, 
as these are not "advances." 
Judge Henry Friendly faced this embarrassment in Dick Warner 
Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.81 In this case, a 
judicial lien creditor garnished a surplus general intangible against 
which a secured party once had a perfected security interest. The 
debtor's balance owed to this secured party, however, had fallen to 
zero, so that the general intangible was available to satisfy the claim of 
the judicial lien creditor. Thereafter, the secured party expended funds 
resisting the loss of this collateral. It therefore claimed that its collec-
tion expenses-incurred after the lien attached-were senior to the ju-
dicial lien creditor's claim. The judicial lien creditor responded that 
59. U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (emphasis added). 
60. See U.C.C. § 9-311. 
61. 746 F.2d. 126 (1984). 
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the collection expenses were not "advances," and section 9-301(4) guar-
anteed priority only to future advances. 
Judge Friendly indicated that any collection expenses related back 
to the original advance to which they were related.81 Here he forgot 
that no outstanding advances existed to which the expenses in ques-
tion could relate; the secured party simply wanted to keep the lien 
creditor away from an unencumbered intangible. In any case, 
Friendly's idea was that a genuinely senior advance sucked in all the 
incidentals related to it. 
Although a strong argument exists that Dick Warner was wrongly 
decided-that secured parties should not be able to squeeze out judi-
cial lien creditors by running up collection expenses63-the Permanent 
Editorial Board has attempted to intervene on behalf of secured credi-
tors against the general creditors by specifically endorsing the result in 
Dick Warner. 64 Therefore, if this intervention is to be given effect, 
purchase money secured parties could be the unintended beneficiaries. 
If the purchase money advance has a high priority over an after-ac-
quired property security interest, then any interest or related collection 
expense is simply senior as well, on Judge Friendly's reasoning. 
B. Enabling Lenders 
The definition of an enabling lender has a flaw in it that no one 
has yet exploited, but, given the textual fetishism with which section 9-
107 is approached, it is only a matter of time before courts consider the 
meaning of this omission that I am about to present. 
According to section 9-107: 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" 
to the extent that it is 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or in- . 
curring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor 
· to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value 
is in fact so used. 
62. Id. at 135. 
63. See Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Future Nonaduance Obliga-
tions Under Article 9 of the UCC: Legitimate Priority or Unwarranted Squeeze-Out? , 
102 BANKING L.J . 412 (1985). 
64. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 2 SECTION 9-301(4). The Permanent Editorial 
Board has described § 9-301(4)'s protection of future advances but not other incidentals 
as "just an accident of draftsmanship .... " Id. 
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Notice that a security interest taken by a certain person is automati-
cally a purchase money security interest just because this person took 
it. Who is this person? A person who made advances or incurred obli-
gations to enable the debtor to buy or lease the collateral, if "such 
value" was so used.80 
Under this definition, the problem of collection costs is easily 
solved. Any collection cost incurred by a person who extended 
purchase money credit is a purchase money security interest, even 
though the collection cost is not part of the "price" of the item. In this 
respect, the definition of "enabling lender" is superior to the definition 
applicable to conditional sellers. 
But this one advantage is outweighed by the fantastic breadth of 
the definition to cover other kinds of security interests. Suppose an 
ordinary after-acquired property lender competes with other after-ac-
quired property lenders, but has filed later and so is junior. Suppose 
that this junior secured party then makes a purchase money advance, 
which allows the debtor to obtain only one item of collateral. All of the 
security interests on after-acquired property are now "purchase money 
security interests" under this definition, because they were "taken by a 
person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value 
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral .... "88 
There can be no question that such a reading exploits a mistake 
by the drafters. One piece of proof is the deletion from the Official 
Draft in 1956 of UCC section 9-107(c), which additionally defined a 
purchase money security interest as one: 
taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor 
to pay for or acquire rights in or the use of collateral makes 
advances or incurs an obligation in or the use of collateral 
makes advances or incurs an obligation not more than ten days 
before or after the debtor receives possession of the collateral 
even though the value given is not in fact used to pay the price. 
This provision was deleted from the 1957 Official Draft because it "ex-
tends the purchase money security interest concept too far."87 Notice 
that it dispenses with the tracing requirement, if collateral is indeed 
obtained within days of the advance, or if the advance is given within 
65. Cf. Beard, supra note 1, at 454 (arguing that § 9-107(b) permits pooling of 
· different purchase money security interests held by the same lender). What I argue in 
the text is that nothing in § 9-107(b) prevents the extension of pooling to nonpurchase 
money collateral as well. 
66. U.C.C. § 9-107(b). 
67. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMER• 
CIAL CODE § 9-107. 
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ten days after the debtor obtains the collateral. It therefore loosens the 
connection between the advance and the purchase money collateral 
and was for this reason repealed. Now if relaxation of the tracing rule 
was rejected, it is fair to assume that there must be a nexus between 
the advance, the collateral and the lender making the advance, con-
trary to the theory just presented, based as it is on the literal words of 
section 9-107 (b). · 
Few commentators have noticed that section 9-107(b) can be read 
this abusive way. Gerald McLaughlin writes: "The equipment actually 
purchased with the advance constitutes the purchase money collateral, 
and the amount advanced that was 'in fact . . . used' to acquire rights 
in the equipment is the purchase money debt."68 In fact, neither of 
these propositions is consistent with the exact words of section 9-
107 (b ). Read literally, section 9-107(a) states that, so long as a person 
gives some genuine purchase money, all security interests of that per-
son are purchase money security interests, and all secured claims are 
purchase money claims. McLaughlin, who does not see that any secur-
ity interest might be purchase money if taken by a person who made 
purchase money advances, feels compelled to argue that debt service 
falls within the concept of "advance," as that word is used in section 9-
107(b). He shows considerable discomfort in making this notion work: 
Although the word "advance" in section 9-107(b) appears to 
connote an advance of money, it need not be interpreted so 
narrowly. The financier could be viewed as having "advanced" 
the finance charge to the buyer, not in the form of money, but 
rather in the form of a credit. Even if the "advance" hurdle is 
surmounted, can this "credit advance" be viewed as having in 
fact been used to acquire rights in collateral? It is hard to fit 
the "credit advance" covering the finance charge within this 
language because the "advance" covering the finance charge is 
not directly involved in the buyer's acquisition of rights in 
equipment from the seller."811 
In the end Dean McLaughlin is reduced to arguing that "[t]he drafters 
of the Code . . . must have understood that the financier's advance 'so 
used' would be repaid with a finance charge added to it."70 As for inci-
68. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 699-700. 
69. Id. at 701 (emphasis in original). 
70. McLaughlin has two back-up arguments, but neither works very well. First, he 
notes that § 9-107 refers to purchase money security interests. Under the UCC, 
"purchase" includes "taking by sale." Id. at 702. According to Dean McLaughlin, "[i]n 
the context of Article 9, a sale will always be a credit sale, and credit sale necessarily 
involves a finance charge." Id. Yet Article 9 sometimes does use the word "purchase" to 
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dental charges such as insurance,71 McLaughlin wisely does not even 
try to argue that section 9-107(b) can be read to cover these items. 
Instead, he suggests that "the financier should rely on the Code's gen-
eral principles and policies embodied in section 1-102"-thin gruel in-
deed for secured creditors starved for arguments. McLaughlin 
continues: 
There is no rational basis for treating these incidental costs of 
credit differently from the finance charge. They generally be-
come part of the secured debt when the debtor does not pay 
them directly. Common sense and general business under-
standing argue for their inclusion in section 9-107(b) purchase 
money debt. Thus, section 9-107(b) can be interpreted to in-
clude the finance charge and insurance and filing costs in 
purchase money debt.72 
These matters are somewhat overstated by Dean McLaughlin. Suppose 
a bankruptcy judge is deeply committed to a debtor's fresh start in 
bankruptcy and therefore wants to read Bankruptcy Code section 
522(f)(2) as broadly as possible. It then becomes "rational"-contrary 
to what Dean McLaughlin asserts-to treat the security interest for 
the purchase money advance and the security interest for the inciden-
tals differently. The argument is better, however, when the contest is 
between two competing secured parties. In such a case, it ill behooves 
an after-acquired property lender to claim that the incidentals should 
not bear the superpriority when the after-acquired property lender is 
just as interested in establishing her own security interest for the same 
incidentals as superior. 
Also, the self-evidence of including the incidentals into purchase 
money priority breaks down with regard to attorneys' fees. Suppose a 
exclude an interest charge. For example, § 9-308 refers to "purchasers" of chattel paper, 
yet these are not credit purchasers. In the end, this argument simply restates the touch-
ing testimonial to the skills of the drafters issued earlier, they must have understood 
that purchase money lenders would like priority for interest as well as the advance. 
Second, McLaughlin points out that the penalty in § 9-507(1) in consumer cases for 
creditor misbehavior after repossession (refund of all interest plus a 10% reduction of 
principal) implies that the drafters knew that secured claims contained both and interest 
and principal component. Id. This may be true, but it does not prove that the drafters 
intended for the security interest for interest and principal to have the exact same 
priority. 
71. Id. at 701-02. McLaughlin also sees great difficulties with renegotiated higher 
interest rates as a result of a loan workout, but concludes on the familiar basis of nontex-
tual "logic" that these renegotiated interest charges should be added to purchase money 
priority, the same as the original interest charge. Id. at 705. 
72. Id. at 703. 
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purchase money lender spends lavishly to defend purchase money pri-
ority, hoping to add this expense into the purchase money debt, which 
would then have priority over the competing after-acquired property 
lender. Or suppose the secured party wishes to add these expenses in 
defending against the debtor's section 522(f)(2) avoidance actions. 
These luxuries come entirely at the expense of the competing litigants. 
Here it is not so clear that these parties must indulge the purchase 
money lender in state-of-the-art legal work with regard to the self-in-
terest of the lender.73 
Thus, to summarize, if courts insist that section 9-107(b) must be 
read literally-that any security interest taken by someone who ad-
vances some purchase money is a purchase money security inter-
est-then it is easy to see how debt service, incidentals and collection 
expenses can be brought under purchase money priority. On the other 
hand, if the court has decided not to read the statute literally, the 
court is methodologically free to add whatever else it thinks common 
sense dictates. Therefore, it should be open for a court to adopt Dean 
McLaughlin's admittedly sensible conclusions, since plain meaning of 
the statute cannot govern in purchase money cases. 
Professor Mark Wessman in part sees that section 9-107(b) does 
not tie purchase money priority to the actual purchase money advance, 
but he uses this insight to make a much narrower argument than what 
is presented here. Noticing that "its price" appears in section 9-107(a) 
but not in section 9-107(b), Wessman suggests that enabling lender 
might have a better claim for cross-collateralization clauses than do 
conditional sellers. Nevertheless he would still require that the priority 
be related to actual purchase money advances,74 even though the lan-
guage of section 9-107(b) does not quite require this. Indeed, section 9-
107(b) only requires that a person who has given a purchase money 
advance has taken a security interest; any security interest taken by 
such a person would be a purchase money security interest, if the stat-
ute is read stringently. The failure to realize this has led Wessman to 
worry that debt service might be included in the "price" of a condi-
73. Dean McLaughlin, a faithful friend of the purchase money lender, thinks that 
collection expenses should be freely added to the purchase money priority because other-
wise purchase money lenders will be less likely to extend purchase money credit in the 
first place. Id. at 677. This can never constitute a sufficient argument, without some 
temperance, because any advantage you can think of will likewise encourage purchase 
money lending. For instance, the rule that purchase money lenders should be able to rob 
a bank in case of default would encourage purchase money lending, too, but it is rejected 
because the costs of this rule outweigh its admitted benefits. To assert the benefits of a 
rule without fathoming its costs is always incomplete. 
74. Wessman, supra note 2, at 1317. 
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tional seller, but not the purchase money advance of an enabling 
lender.n 
These thoughts commit the sin of taking seriously the exact words 
of Article 9. Undoubtedly the drafters of Article 9 had no idea that 
future readers of section 9-107 would discern differences in the defini-
tions of purchase money priority between conditional sellers and ena-
bling lenders.78 But, as Professor Wessman points out, if the 
definitions are deemed to be the same, the enabling lender becomes 
vulnerable to losses because of cross-collateralization, whereas a literal 
reading of section 9-107(b) would allow the enabling lender to escape 
this.77 
If non-advance value is integrated with difficulty into section 9-
107(b)-unless the statute is read literally to vindicate any security 
interest owned by someone who made a purchase money ad-
vance-advances used for incidental purposes related to the equipment 
might have an easier time qualifying as purchase money advances, be-
cause any advance that "enables" the debtor to obtain equipment 
qualifies as a purchase money advance. Through the miracle of remote 
or distant cause, a great many advances might qualify. Dean McLaugh-
lin, for example, fears that advances to cover general overhead ex-
penses might be purchase money, because they "enabled" the debtor to 
be in the position of utilizing the equipment actually bought with a 
purchase money advance. Or-a little less ambitiously-he fears that 
an advance used to prepare a factory for receipt of equipment might be 
an enabling advance. "The scope of section 9-107(b) is not so sweep-
ing," he assures us,78 but nothing in the text of section 9-107(b) autho-
rizes McLaughlin's confidence that scope's broom is so ineffectual. 
IV. DUAL STATUS OR TRANSFORMATION? 
The single biggest issue in the definition of purchase money is 
whether the purchase money secured party is permitted to have several 
security interests on the purchase money collateral, some of which are 
not purchase money security interests. Some courts would say that the 
presence of a nonpurchase money security interest transforms all the 
75. Id. at 1318. 
76. Id. at 1322. 
77. Id. at 1318. Wessman also adds that obliterating the difference between ena-
bling loans and conditional sale also eases the ability of the enabling lender to claim that 
debt service is part of the purchase money priority, but as we have argued above, the 
enabling lender can already argue that debt service has a purchase money priority, be-
cause any security interest taken by an enabling lender is a purchase money security 
interest. 
78. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 705. 
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security interests of the lender into nonpurchase money security inter-
ests, even though, through sound allocation methods, a purely 
purchase money security interest could be identified. 
There are two kinds of mistakes that might transform a purchase 
money security interest into an ordinary one: (1) If the security agree-
ment provides that future purchases secure the earlier purchase money 
loan, so that any given purchase money claim can be enforced against 
nonpurchase money collateral, then all of the sequential purchase 
money . security interests are deemed nonpurchase money. These are 
called "collateral add-on clauses." (2) If the security agreement pro-
vides that purchase money collateral secures future advances as well as 
the original purchase money advance, the security interest has been 
proclaimed not purchase money. These are called "debt add-on 
clauses." The most aggressive view of the transformation rule is that it 
applies whenever a mere contractual future advance clause exists, even 
if no future advance has been made.79 
These two clauses are said to "transform" the purchase money se-
curity interest into the nonpurchase money variety, and so courts refer 
to the loss of purchase money status as the "transformation rule. "80 
The transformation rule, as applied in bankruptcy cases, does further 
the cause of the debtor's fresh start, both under section 522(f)(2) and 
section lll0(a), but, according to Professor Robert Lloyd: 
the transformation rule is at best a meat-axe approach to fur-
thering these purposes . . . . If we apply the transformation 
rule, the clever secured creditor may well be able to document 
around it, even while engaging in the most abusive enterprises. 
On the other hand, the unwary seller who through generosity 
or self-interest adds some delinquent interest to principal loses 
his purchase money security interest. The debtor who dealt 
with him gets the collateral without paying for it, thus thwart-
ing section 522(f)'s apparent purpose of protecting the 
purchase money lender.•1 
On the other hand, the transformation rule does discourage cross-col-
lateralization clauses, which prevent the debtor from ever owning any-
79. In re Booker, 9 B.R. 710, 711-12 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (Moseley, J.) (dictum, 
as additional advances did occur); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) 
(Wolfe, J .) (dictum, novation through refinancing also found); In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243, 246-48 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1966) (Nims, J .) (dictum, as se-
curity interest was perfected by possession and survived avoidance). 
80. In re Snipes, 86 B.R. 1006, 1007 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (Kroger, J.). 
81. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 84-85. 
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thing free and clear of the claims of the secured creditors.81 As a major 
purpose of section 522(f)(2) is based on the idea that security interests 
in household goods are in terrorem instruments, rather than, genuine 
security, the transformation rule would at least further this important 
purpose.88 For this reason, some have suggested that the transforma-
tion rule might persist in consumer cases, but should definitely be re-
jected in purely commercial cases, such as those involving priority to 
inventory.84 
Another virtue "cited for the transformation rule is that it does not 
implicate a bankruptcy court in the tedious task of allocating pay-
ments between the purchase money and nonpurchase money parts of 
the security interest.85 Also, some courts think that, because purchase 
money status gives special privileges to the secured party, it is fair that 
82. Such a cross-collateralization clause was the source of a classic statement of the 
doctrine of unconscionability in contract. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 
F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J .). Many state statutes actually endorse such a pro-
creditor system of allocating payments in legislation, with the effect that the creditor's 
security interests are prolonged in life until the total debt is paid; at no time does any 
single item become disencumbered until everything is disencumbered. Michigan Note, 
supra note 16, at 865-68, 870-71. 
83. According to the legislative history: 
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a security in-
terest in all of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver by the debtor of his 
exemptions. In most of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the consequences 
of the forms he signs. The creditor's experience provides him with a substan-
tial advantage. If the debtor encounters financial difficulty, creditors often use 
threats of repossession of all of the debtor's household goods as a means of 
obtaining payment. 
In fact, were the creditor to carry through on his threat and foreclose on 
the property, he would receive little, for household goods have little resale 
value. They are far more valuable to the creditor in the debtor's hands, for 
they provide a credible basis for the threat, because the replacement costs of 
the goods are generally high. Thus, creditors rarely repossess, and debtors, ig-
norant of the creditors' true intentions, are coerced into payments they simply 
cannot afford to make. ' 
The exemption provision allows the debtor, after bankruptcy has been 
filed, and creditor collection techniques have been stayed, to undo the conse-
quences of a contract of adhesion, signed in ignorance, by permitting the inval-
idation of nonpurchase money security interests in household goods. Such 
security interests have too often been used by over-reaching creditors. The bill 
eliminates any unfair advantage creditors have. 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss. at 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6088 (foot-
note omitted). 
84. Kawasho Int'! (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv: (Callaghan) 203, 208 ,(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (Goldhaber, J.); Beard, supra 
note 1, at 446-48. 
85. In re Booker, 9 B.R. 710, 712 (Bankr. M .D. Ga. 1981) (Moseley, J .). 
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the burden on the secured party is extremely high in showing that the 
security interest is purely purchase money.88 
In contrast, some courts are willing to save purchase money status 
by invoking the "dual status" rule. Under this rule, a court allocates 
between nonpurchase money and purchase money status. On this view, 
the secured party owns two different claims, one of which is purchase 
money and the other not. In support of the '. 'dual status" rule, its advo-
cates are able to point to the phrase "to the extent" in section 9-107. 
This _language is said to indicate a legislative intent that a single loan 
might have two natures-one a purchase money nature and the other 
not.87 
If a dual status rule is followed, then it is necessary to allocate 
past repayments to either the purchase money or -the nonpurchase 
money side of the obligation.88 When a security agreement provides an 
allocation formula, courts are willing to abide by it, and indeed have 
even been persuaded to institute the dual status rule rather than the 
transformation rule when such allocations are contractually provided 
for. 88 Or, some courts have found in state retail legislation formulas for 
allocating payments upon which they base a dual-status rule,90 though 
other courts have refused to use such legislation to help purchase 
money secured parties. 91 On the other hand, when no such allocation is 
described in the security agreement, courts have chosen the transfor-
mation rule and proclaimed the purchase money status to have en-
ded.91 Yet even here, some courts have supplied a tracing rule in aid of 
86. In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N,C. 1980) (Wolfe, J.) . 
87. Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 
1984) (Weis, J .) ("a purchase-money security interest in a quantity of goods can remain 
such 'to the extent' it secures the price of that item, even though it may also secure the 
payment of other articles.") (citations omitted); McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 679. 
88. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 681. 
89. Bond's Jewelers, Inc. v. Linklater (In re Linklater), 48 B.R. 916, 919-20 (Bankr. 
D. Nev. 1985) {Jones, J .); Keller v. Household Fin. Corp. Retail Servs., Inc. (In re Kel-
ler), 29 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (Paskay, J.); In re Mattson, 20 B.R. 382, 385 
{Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (Martin, J.). 
90. Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 
1984) (Weis, J .); Schewe Furniture Co. v. Goard (In re Goard), 26 B.R. 316, 318 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1982) (Reynolds, J .); In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 (W.D. 
Mich. 1969) (in a voidable preference case, allowing state retail sales legislation to make 
up for a lack of an apportionment rule in the contract) . 
91. Norrell v. W.S. Badcock Corp. (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435, 436 (M.D. Ga. 
1977) (Owens, J.); In re Beasley, 23 B.R. 404, 406 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1982) (Moore, J.) ; In 
re Trotter, 12 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) {Dooley, J .). 
92. Credithrift of Am. v. Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn) , 20 B.R. 695, 697 {Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1982) (Bland, J .); In re Hobdy, 18 B.R. 70, 73 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); Coomer 
v. Barclays Am. Fin., Inc. (In re Coomer), 8 B.R. 351, 355 {Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) 
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the purchase money secured party, when the contract or legislation is 
unavailable. 98 
According to Professor Robert Lloyd's powerful and persuasive 
history of the transformation rule, it simply did not exist prior to the 
enactment of the UCC. Rather, precode law uniformly instituted the 
dual status rule with regard to both debt add-on and collateral add-
on." The birth of the transformation rule is traced not so very far back 
to In re Simpson . .,. This bankruptcy referee's decision was later relied 
upon by the Fifth Circuit in Roberts Furniture Co v. Pierce (In re Ma-
nuel)." After Manuel, the transformation rule became relatively well 
established, though often rejected in favor of the dual status rule. 
In Simpson, referee David E. Nims thought the UCC dictated the 
transformation rule.97 According to section 9-107 Comment 2: 
(Kelley, J .); Mulcahy v. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. (In re Mulcahy), 3 B.R. 454, 457 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1980) (Bayt, J.) (where secured party did not put security agreement 
into evidence, court presumed no allocation formuia existed). 
In Norrell v. W.S. Badcock Corp. (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977) 
(Owen, J.), state retail sales legislation existed to require that payments from the debtor 
be first used to disencumber the first item bought on credit. But the contract had no 
apportionment formula, and so the court proclaimed the purchase money security inter-
est unperfected, because the secured party had never filed a financing statement. See 
also Slay v. Pioneer Credit Co. (In re Slay), 8 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (Kelley, 
J.) (because no repayment had occurred at all, it was possible to allocate between 
purchase money and nonpurchase money advances for purposes of dual status rule). 
93. Sprague v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Sprague), 29 B.R. 711, 712-13 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (Gibbons, J.) (FIFO); Associates Fin. v. Conn (In re Conn), 16 
B.R. 454, 458 (Bankr. W.D. Ky 1982) (Deitz, J.) (FIFO); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (Pusateri, J.) (FIFO); Lloyd, supra note 3, at 86-100. 
94. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 25-38. Lloyd also shows that the influential New York 
State Law Revision Commission, which almost ignored the UCC's definition of purchase 
money priority, nevertheleBB took time to cite a case that held for the dual status rule. 
N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION CoMM'N 1955 REPORT 2062 (1955), citing Chase Nat. Bank v. 
Sweezy, 281 N.Y.S. 487 (1931) (Callahan, J.), aff'd, 236 A.D. 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932), 
aff'd, 185 N.E. 803 (N.Y. 1933). According to Lloyd, this implies that this commission 
assumed the dual status rule would continue under the UCC. 
95. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1966). 
96. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975). 
97. The Simpson court went so far as to suggest that the mere presence of a future 
advance clause transformed the purchase money security interest into something else, 
though, in the case, advances were in fact made. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247; compare 
Kawasho Int'! (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv.(Callaghan) 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (mere presence of such a clause does not destroy 
purchase money status if no advances were given). It might be noted, however, that the 
secured party survived unscathed, because it had repossessed the collateral prior to 
bankruptcy. This repossession constituted perfection. And, as perfection occurred at a 
time when the secured party had no reason to believe the transfer was preferential, see 
Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), the security interest could not be avoided. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
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When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured 
party who is not a seller, he must of course have given present 
consideration. This section therefore provides that the 
purchase money party must be one who gives value "by making 
advances or incurring an obligation": the quoted language ex-
cludes from the purchase money category any security interest 
taken as security for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or 
antecedent debt. 
825 
Now Comment 2 discourages antecedent debt from qualifying for 
purchase money priority; as Nims could see no difference between debt 
add-on and antecedent debt, he proclaimed that the entire security in-
terest transformed into a nonpurchase money variety. 
Acknowledging "to the extent" in the preamble to section 9-107 
pointed to the dual status rule,88 Nims seemed to think that Comment 
2 also proved that section 9-107 could not be read literally. Some have· 
taken this remark to be a non sequitur.88 But it must be admitted by 
now that section 9-107 simply cannot be read literally. A literal reading 
would mean that any security interest taken by an enabling 
lender-even on nonpurchase money collateral-is a purchase money 
security interest.100 Or that purchase money priority cannot include 
debt service or collection costs.101 Therefore, even if Comment 2 does 
not prove that section 9-107 cannot be read literally, the point is nev-
ertheless one that even opponents of the transformation rule must 
concede.102 
Professor Lloyd scores some other effective points against Simp-
son. Lloyd notes that the drafters of the UCC would not have insti-
tuted a change so important as the repeal of the dual status rule 
at 249. One wonders how a repossessing secured party could be devoid of any hint of 
financial trouble, however. 
98. Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 247. 
99. See Associates Fin. v. Conn. (In re Conn), 16 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1982) ("We are especially hard pressed to find in the Comment any indication that Sec-
tion 9-107 is not to be read literally."). The comment is, as we have seen, not even cor-
rect. Since § 9-107 does not require that the security agreement be signed before the 
debtor obtains the collateral, the security interest granted in a late security agreement 
would indeed be a security interest on antecedent debt. Nothing prevents such a security 
interest from being purchase money. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 64-77. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 43-58. 
102. Professor Lloyd has complained that Comment 2 deals with an enabling loan, 
whereas Simpson involved a conditional sale. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 49. But this is not 
entirely a good complaint. Referee Nims in part wanted to establish that § 9-107 cannot 
be read literally, and so Nims was not obliged to give effect to the phrase "to the extent." 
826 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
without disclosing it specifically.103 Yet even here it must be conceded 
that incidents do exist where changes were allegedly instituted without 
specific acknowledgement. The adoption of a race priority instead of a 
race-notice priority would be one example.10' In Simpson, Referee 
Nims also cited a treatise for the proposition that a dual status 
purchase money security interest was impossible, though elsewhere in 
the treatise, precisely this proposition is defended.100 And finally, Nims 
took precode law to be in accord with the transformation rule, citing as 
the sole authority for this erroneous proposition an unpublished opin-
ion from 1961 from a Michigan federal judge.106 
Nevertheless, in spite of these analytical weaknesses, Judge Phillip 
Nichols, in Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 101 praised 
Simpson as "well thought out, and documented with references to the 
Official Code Comment #2, and to secondary authority." He therefore 
happily invested the prestige of the Fifth Circuit in this rule.108 
Another early treatment of the transformation rule is Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley). 1011 In this case, a condi-
tional seller sold a stereo and then a freezer o·n credit subject to a 
cross-collateralization clause: This clause specifically allocated pay-
ments to the first item bought. The bankruptcy court ruled that the 
security interest on the freezer was perfected, but the security interest 
on the stereo was not. Not satisfied with the freezer, the secured party 
(Goodyear) appealed with regard to the stereo. On appeal, Judge Wil-
bur Owen ruled that the security interest in the stereo was immune 
from the transformation rule: 
Goodyear's security interest in the stereo by the explicit terms 
of the agreement was to terminate as soon as the purchase 
price of the stereo was paid. Because the collateral thus se-
cured only debt representing its price, the security agreement 
103. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 50. 
104. See David Gray Carlson, Rationality, Accident and Priority Under Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 70 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1986) (arguing that the race 
priority generates from confusion about how to deal with future advances, not from a 
desire to benefit bad faith secured parties, and that the latter conclusion is a later gloss 
by law professors). 
105. In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1966), citing PETER COOGAN, ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 470 (1958). Dual status is defended in the same treatise at id § 19.02[1)[c]. 
106. See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 51. 
107. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975). 
108. "With the weight of the Fifth Circuit behind it," Professor Lloyd writes, the 
transformation rule gained momentum, and other courts relied on it uncritically." Lloyd, 
supra note 3, at 52. 
109. 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977). 
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did create a purchase money security interest which, being in a 
consumer good, did not need to be filed in order to be 
perfected. 110 
827 
Now this doesn't follow in the slightest. Suppose the stereo and the 
freezer each cost $1,000 and Staley defaulted_ straight out. Suppose 
that the freezer brought only $800 in a foreclosure sale. The lender 
could look to the stereo for the $200 deficit from the freezer. Because 
this is so, the stereo did secure both a purchase money advance and a 
nonpurchase money advance; the same was true for the freezer. That 
payments were allocated first to the stereo is consistent with the non-
existence of cross-collateralization, but, as the contract specifically pro-
vided for it, 111 allocation could not cancel out the cross-
collateralization that might be fatal to purchase money status. m 
To this should be compared Norrell v. W.S. Badcock Corp. (In re 
Norrell), 118 also decided by Judge Owen. In Norrell, no contractual al-
location existed, but a statute required that payments first be allocated 
to the first item purchased. Owen thought that a contractual allocation 
cancels an otherwise fatal cross-collateralization clause but a statutory 
allocation could have no such effect. Hence, he applied the transforma-
tion rule and destroyed the purchase money priority. 
Since these early cases, the trend seems to be against the transfor-
mation rule and in favor of the dual status rule. m This trend has most 
recently been represented in the monumental Eastern Airlines bank-
ruptcy. In First National Bank v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, 
Inc.), 110 Eastern Airlines had signed a comprehensive indenture in 
1963, to govern various borrowings that Eastern undertook. Under this 
indenture, lenders pooled their collateral with other lenders. Some of 
the loans pooled under the indenture enabled Eastern to acquire new 
110. Id. at 438. 
111. The security agreement read: "I hereby grant to Goodyear a security interest 
in each item of merchandise purchased or hereafter purchased under this Agreement, 
and Goodyear shall retain such security interest in each item of merchandise until it is 
paid for in full." Id. at 437. 
112. Professor Lloyd thinks that Staley is consistent with Simpson and Manuel: 
Even though the security agreement stated that the first item purchased se-
cured the purchase price of the items purchased later, the fact that the pur-
chaser could obtain the release of the first item by paying its purchase price 
meant that as a pr~ctical matter the first item secured only its purchase price. 
Lloyd, supra note 3, at 53. 
113. 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977). 
114. An important case at the appellate level is Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, 
Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1984) (Weis, J.), favoring dual status. 
115. 123 B.R. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Sweet, J.), reu 'g 112 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (Lifland, J.). 
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equipment. Others were nonpurchase money loans. The right to en-
force any given security interest was vested in an indenture trustee. 
Thus, the indenture trustee lender had the equivalent of a collateral 
add-on clause.118 And, since new lenders could join the pool, the inden-
ture trustee also had a debt add-on right with respect to any given 
plane (though loans were supplied by individual beneficiaries of the 
trust). In case of a foreclosure, the beneficiaries would divide up the 
cash equally.117 
In Eastern's bankruptcy, Eastern moved for a declaration that 
neither the indenture trustee nor any given lender had a right to seize 
planes under authority of section lllO(a). Judge Lifland ruled in East-
em's favor for three reasons. First, the purchase money lenders had 
agreed to be pari passu with other nonpurchase money lenders under 
the indenture.118 He concluded that this meant that the security inter-
est was on the collateral pool as a whole and hence not a purchase 
money security interest at all.119 
On the basis of finding but one claim and one creditor, Judge Lif-
land rejected the lenders' theory that the purchase money lenders had 
partially assigned their priority to the nonpurchase money lenders 
(presumably in exchange for partial assignments of nonpurchase 
money claims back to the purchase money lenders). A purchase money 
loan does not ordinarily lose its purchase money status merely because 
it is sold by the original lender to a third party. If not, then the partial 
assignee of the purchase money loan might still enjoy purchase money 
status, even while it held a nonpurchase money status at the same 
time. The assignment theory would have allowed the purchase money 
lenders to claim that they, together with the nonpurchase money lend-
ers, could join to assert the pre-assignment purchase money status. 
But, according to Lifland, none of the lenders had direct security inter-
ests in planes at all. Only the trustee did, for the benefit of all lenders 
116. 123 B.R. at 169 ("All of the loans issued pursuant to the Indenture are se-
cured by all of the property in the Collateral Pool, so that if Eastern defaults on any one 
of the loans ... [the trustee] may take possession of any or all of the property in the 
Collateral Pool .... "). 
117. Id. 
118. In re Ionosphere Clubs, 112 B.R. at 83. 
119. Id. 
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together.120 Therefore, Lifland thought that nothing was assigned be-
tween the beneficiary lenders. 121 
Although Lifland thought that the lenders had no purchase money 
security interest because of collateral add-ons, he also ruled in the al-
ternative that the purchase money status was forfeit because of the 
lenders' debt add-on clauses. 
In so far as this theory rested on a debt add-on clause, Judge Lif-
land once again asserted that there was only one lender-the indenture 
trustee-not several lenders. That several lenders claim the same 
purchase money collateral could not deprive them of superpriority sta-
tus if some separate lender advances a nonpurchase money loan. The 
whole point of this status is to proyide seniority over competing lend-
ers. Hence, the "single lender" metaphysics was necessary to invoke 
the transformation rule from the debt side. But if one recognizes that 
the trustee represents diverse lenders, and if one focuses on this diver-
sity, the consumer cases would be inapplicable. 
The problem with Judge Lifland's assertory metaphysics (that the 
whole is essential and its constituent units meaningless) is that one 
could, with equal dignity, ass·ert that the whole is meaningless-it is 
rather an aggregate of units. m Since the purchase money lenders con-
tributed units of purchase money collateral, they are purchase money 
lenders for those units. 
And so, whereas Judge Lifland saw a single pool of collateral and a 
single lender, Judge Sweet, on appeal, saw an aggregate of individual 
planes and a group of individual lenders.123 Thus, purchase money se-
curity interests did exist on certain of the planes, even if the security 
interest on other planes were nonpurchase money security interests. 
And to account for the fact that these lenders had to share their super-
priority with nonpurchase money lenders, Judge Sweet compared this 
120. Id. at 86-87. See U.C.C. § 9-105(m) ("When the holders of obligations issued 
under an indenture of trust . . . are represented by a trustee or other person, the repre-
sentative is the secured party."). 
121. 112 B.R. at 87. The lenders had tried to argue that the indenture trustee was 
like a "hypothetical assignee," who would inherit the purchase money status of the as-
signor. Judge Lifland rejected this analogy for two reasons. First, the trustee was not an 
assignee. Second, "it is undisputed that [the indenture trustee] is not entitled to § 1110 
treatment." Id. Both of these dismissals are too quick. If the trustee took over responsi-
bility for the lender's funds, the trustee might be a purchase money lender directly on 
behalf of all the pari passu lenders. And if it is "undisputed" that the trustee has no 
rights under Bankruptcy Code § lll0(a), it is only true if the trustee is not a purchase 
money lender. The hypothetical assignment argument, no matter how clumsily phrased, 
might have worked to give the trustee those rights. 
122. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 46-48 (1975). 
123. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 123 B.R. 166, 171, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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sharing of priority with the partial assignment of the purchase money 
secured claim to the nonpurchase money lenders. Since an assignee of 
a purchase money claim inherited the purchase money priority the as-
signor had, m the status could still be asserted by all the lenders 
together. 
With regard to the collateral add-on clause, Judge Sweet also 
thought that UCC section 9-107 precluded the transformation rule in 
favor of the dual status rule. For this, Sweet relied on the by-now-
familiar "to the extent" language in section 9-107.1H But, warned 
Judge Sweet, there must be some rational means of identifying pay-
ments to the two different loans. Since, in the Eastern case, the loans 
came from separate lenders, allocation of payments was easy. 1ae Hence, 
Sweet, in reversing Judge Lifland, brought the case in line with the 
apparent trend in favor of the dual status rule. 
A. The Transformation Rule and Inventory 
The transformation rule, if applied to inventory, would virtually 
end purchase money priority for inventory lenders. That is because, 
whenever more than one item of inventory is bought, each item secures 
the price of every other item. Unless the parties separately match 
purchase price to each individual item of inventory, inventory lending 
is inherently "debt add-on." Absent a hurculean accounting system 
that matches every unit of price with every item of collateral, the 
transformation rule destroys the purchase money priority for inventory 
lenders unless two things are true: (a) the UCC demands the dual sta-
tus rule, and (b) the UCC demands tracing rules that match up por-
tions of the debt with units of inventory and, later, payment to the 
secured party with the payment of the price of specific items of 
inventory. 117 
124. Sweet cited Billings v. Avco Colo. Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405 
(10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J .), a case holding that a refinanced purchase money security 
interest still had purchase money status, for purposes of § 522(0(2). But the case also 
involved an assignment of a purchase money security interest before it was refinanced, 
so that the case was indeed good authority for the proposition that purchase money sta-
tus survives assignment. 
125. In re Ionosphere Clubs, 123 B.R. at 172, citing McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 
691-92, 696. For an airplane case applying § lll0(a) despite debt add-ons, see In re 
Express Air, 136 B.R. 328, 332 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Hillman, J.). 
126. In re Ionosphere _Clubs , 123 B.R. at 172-73. 
127. But see Paul M. Shupack, Defining the Collateral 29 IDAHO L. REV. 785-791 
(1993) (arguing that § 9-107 establishes an "entity" theory that allows all purchase 
money collateral to be pooled together). 
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Professor Wessman agrees with this observation in a series of in-
teresting hypotheticals. But the problem is much more thoroughgoing 
than he realizes. No security interest in inventory can be a purchase 
money security interest if invent9ry has the barest plurality, unless the 
UCC embodies a dual status rule with liberal tracing rules. 
Wessman gives the following example that purports to raise alloca-
tion problems. He posits an enabling lender financing two separate 
purchases of widgets. According to the security agreement, the ena-
bling lender has both collateral add-on and debt add-on rights. A wid-
get costs $1 wholesale. The debtor buys 60,000 widgets per batch, so 
that the debtor has bought 120,000 of widgets on $120,000 worth of 
credit in total. The debtor then sells $20,000 of widgets and pays the 
enabling lender $20,000. The enabling lender would like to claim a 
purchase money priority as to the remaining $100,000 in widgets.128 If 
the transformation rule is in effect, the enabling lender has forfeited 
purchase money priority. 
This would not occur, Wessman argues, if there had been only one 
advance of $120,000 and one purchase of 120,000 widgets.128 Because 
the transformation rule clearly does not apply here, "[i]t is unjust," 
Wessman suggests, "that such a slight difference in the form of the 
transaction should make such a dramatic difference in the collectibility 
of its debt."130 
In fact, it is possible to claim that both transactions are subject to 
the transformation rule, if one assumes that each individual widget is 
separate from every other. If Wessman thinks the second one escapes, 
it is by virtue of insisting that each batch of widgets is the "thing." 
Suppose for example that the debtor loses a single widget but still 
owes $1 to the enabling lender for this item. Is it not the case that the 
other 119,999 widgets are security for the debt associated with the lost 
widget? If so, then the 119,999 widgets secure both "its price" and the 
price of every other widget. Because this is so, the enabling lender has 
both a debt add-on and a collateral add-on right, and the single batch 
is just as much subject to the transformation rule as was the example 
in which the widgets were purchased in two installments. 
The only way Wessman can avoid this conclusion is by asserting . 
that each batch of widgets is a separate thing. Widgets themselves are 
deprived of their individuality; their identity is communistically ab-
sorbed into that of the batch. This is very close to the discredited "en-
tity" theory of inventory, where all inventory taken together is "the 
128. Wessman, supra note 2, at 1319. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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thing." On the entity theory, Wessman's two batches are a single thing 
and therefore no transformation rule can be applied to this united 
thing either. 
To conclude, then, the "two-batch" example succumbs to the 
transformation rule because each batch is a separate thing. The single 
batch survived because no two "things" cross-collateralized each other. 
Yet if each widget is accorded individuality, then both examples be-
come fodder for the transformation rule. 
Wessman tries a separate argument-"its price" is meaningless in 
inventory cases. The idea is to show that associating any "thing" with 
"its price" depends on nonfalsifiable leaps of faith. Under the tenets of 
logical positivism, this dependence on faith makes these allocations 
"meaningless." Since "its price" is meaningless, it can be ignored in 
interpreting section 9-107. This erasure of "its price" from section 9-
107 is one that Wessman does not endorse, because logical positivism is 
an unfashionable philosophy we may safely ignore. 
To prove this, Wessman asks us to assume that the enabling 
lender has made a single advance of $60,000, and the debtor has used 
this advance to buy $60,000 · of widgets. The debtor sells $20,000 of 
widgets and later pays $20,000 to the enabling lender. According to 
Wessman, it would be "laughable" for a competing after-acquired 
property lender to argue that the $20,000 payment to the enabling 
lender went to pay the "price" of widgets not yet sold. If, in spite of its 
laughability, this proposition were true, these unsold widgets are disen-
cumbered and are available to the after-acquired property lender. 
Meanwhile, the widgets actually sold were disencumbered by section 9-
307(1), and the enabling lender simply lost this collateral. 
Such an argument, Wessman writes, is completely untenable: 
There is no rational basis for dividing the original 60,000 dollar 
debt into segments, sorting the widgets into sub-piles, as-
signing a debt segment to each sub-pile and forcing [the 
debtor] to guess which sub-pile will be sold first or to which 
debt segment to apply the initial payment. Clearly, as of Feb-
ruary 15, [the enabling lender] has a purchase money security 
interest in all 40,000 widgets remaining in [the debtor's] 
inventory.181 
First, it might be pointed out that if the $20,000 paid to the enabling 
lender were the cash proceeds of the widgets actually sold, the alloca-
tion that Wessman pronounces to be "clear" would indeed be so. In the 
case of cash proceeds, no act of allocation takes place at all. Rather, 
131. Id. at 1320. 
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the cash proceeds are directly connected with the sold inventory and 
cannot possibly be allocated to the unsold inventory. But Wessman 
seems to have in mind the payment of unencumbered dollars, not cash 
proceeds. In such a case, allocation is necessary. Yet any alloca-
tion-even the one Wessman praises as "clear"-is a metaphysical as-
sumption that is by no means clear or self-evident. 
Indeed, there are legal arguments against the allocation that Wess-
man says is clear. Under the law of payment, the debtor has a right to 
state what a payment means. For example, if the debtor owes a credi-
tor on claim A and claim B, the debtor has power to allocate any given 
payment to one or the other claim. Therefore, in the absence of any 
contractual agreement or governing legislation, the debtor might have 
said, "This payment of $20,000 relates to inventory not yet sold." 
Under the law of payment, the creditor would be bound by this. 
If the debtor is silent, then the law of payment says that the credi-
tor may allocate the payments as she sees fit. Under this view, the 
creditor has an incentive to proclaim that the payment relates to the 
widgets already sold, thereby guaranteeing that the unsold widgets re-
main as security for the debtor's outstanding obligation to pay $40,000. 
If neither side had an intent as to the meaning of the payment, then 
we must look to the law for a "gap filler" to supply this missing intent. 
A popular gap-filler in a bankruptcy context does indeed support the 
result that Wessman has proclaimed as "clear."133 
Yet, in this exercise, we still divided the thing into sub-
things-the pile into sub-piles. This subdivision of the entity is inevi-
table and must be done. Hence, Wessman is wrong that there is no 
"rational basis" to subdivide the pile. Subdivision there must be, and 
the only question is: "Whose ox shall we gore as we subdivide the pile 
of widgets?" Therefore, subdividing the pile is rationally necessary, 
though the means by which the subdivision occurs is a political matter. 
As the law now stands, it is open for the parties to contract for any 
allocation they want. And if there is no contract, the debtor has the 
superior power-and the economic incentive-to do just the opposite 
of what Wessman thinks is the only answer. This is so at least when 
payment is by means of unencumbered dollars. 
132. In Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1982) (Jameson, J .), the 
court reasoned that payments to an undersecured creditor are to be applied first ~ the 
unsecured portion of the undersecured claim, thereby maximizing the amount of collat-
eral for the secured party (but also making any such payment to the secured party pref-
erential). See also Gray v. A.I. Credit Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 130 B.R. 1, 3 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (Votolato, J .). 
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From this assumption that the payment of unencumbered dollars 
must necessarily be allocated to the widgets actually sold, Wessman 
then argues that these principles must hold even if the debtor bought 
the 60,000 widgets in several batches, not just one. Yet this does not 
follow, because the single-batch assumptions were never proven in the 
first place. 
Wessman concludes by invoking the bad reputation oflogical posi-
tivism to def eat his own argument: 
In its present form, however, [the enabling lender's] argu-
ment goes too far. In particular, it depends upon the premise 
that, if there is no empirical basis (e.g., accounting entries) for 
separating purported purchase money debt into segments cor-
responding to the "price" of each item of collateral, it is mean-
ingless to speak of such segments or "prices." This sounds a 
great deal like logical positivism, which, in its extreme form, 
identified the meaning of a sentence with the set of empirical 
propositions which would verify or refute it. Logical positivism 
is now decidedly out of favor .... It is therefore unlikely that 
[the enabling lender] may dismiss the question whether 
purchase money collateral secures more than "its price" as 
mere gibberish. 133 
What Wessman seems to be saying here is that there is nothing "natu-
ral" or "clear" about any given allocation rule. Rather, the allocations 
upon which the purchase money priority depends are deeply political 
and moral judgments; this doesn't make them meaningless. The win-
ners and losers of litigation certainly don't find them so. These leaps of 
faith are made by all parties in this dispute. In the end, the choice of a 
transformation rule or a dual status rule, or the allocations needed to 
make the latter work, are inevitably political decisions-"questions for 
the legislature," in positivist prose. 
B. State or Federal Law? 
One thing that is rarely made apparent in the cases interpreting 
section 522(0(2) is whether the courts are following the state law of 
purchase money status or whether they are following a federal rule. 134 
133. Wessman, supra note 2, at 1320-21 (footnotes omitted). 
134. See Billings v. Avco Colo. Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 406 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (Logan, J.) (transformation rule said to be matter for state law in a refinancing 
case); Fickey v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Fickey), 23 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1982) (Kelley, J.) (Georgia law governs transformation rule, "[t)o the extent state law is 
relevant."). 
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If the former is true, it is open for local legislators to change the con-
tent of bankruptcy law by openly adopting either the transformation 
rule or the dual status rule. · 
Some cases are surely pure state law questions. For instance, in 
the notorious Southeast Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp,m, the 
court used the transformation rule to deny a purchase money secured 
party its priority over an after-acquired property secured party. This 
decision, a "diversity" case, must be a matter for state law.188 
Similarly, if the transformation rule is applied to a security inter-
est in consumer goods, where the secured party relies upon automatic 
perfection, 137 the transformation renders the purchase money security 
interest unperfected and hence vulnerable to the, bankruptcy trustee's 
strong arm power or voidable preference power. Each of these powers 
depends upon the state-law priority between a judicial lien and an un-
perfected security interest.138 Therefore, the transformation rule is a 
state law question; no special federal policy is implicated. The classic 
statement of the transformation rule occurred in a voidable preference 
context in Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel). 139 In this 
case, the secured party had not filed a financing statement, which was 
fine, if the secured party were advancing purchase money to a con-
135. 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
136. This case is usually excoriated in strong terms. See Beard, supra note 1, 
passim. 
137. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). 
138. Voidable preference theory depends on the priority of judicial liens through § 
547(e). This is purely a timing rule to determine when a security interest is deemed 
transferred from the debtor to the secured party. 
According to § 547(e)(l)(B): "a transfer of a fixture or property other than real 
property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee." Meanwhile, according to § 547(e)(2), a 
transfer is deemed made: 
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the 
transferee [i.e., when it attaches], if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 
days after, such time; 
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected af-
ter such 10 days; or 
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such trans-
fer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; or 
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor 
and the transferee. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (1988). Putting these rules together, a security interest that is never 
perfected under Article 9 will be deemed transferred just before the bankruptcy petition, 
pursuant to § 547(e)(2)(C)(i). 
139. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975) (Nichols, J .). 
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sumer.140 But the lender had both a debt add-on and a collateral add-
on right. It made subsequent purchase money loans to the debtor, and 
each item was collateral for any given loan. The court declared that 
purchase money status was forfeit. This made the security interest un-
perfected and hence prey to the trustee's strong arm power.141 
But two other issues are not so clearly state-law questions. First, 
non purchase money security interests in · certain exempt property are 
void under section 522(0(2). The transformation rule is most fre-
quently used in consumer bankruptcy cases. For example, if a secured 
party advances nonpurchase money and allows the original purchase 
money collateral to secure the new as well as the old loan (debt add-
on), purchase money status has been deemed forfeit. 141 Consolidation 
of two loans into one also destroys purchase money status, at least if 
140. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). 
141. When an automatically perfected security interest in consumer goods under-
goes a lapse in perfection, it becomes necessary for a judge to choose between two differ-
ent lapse rules, which are supplied for more different contexts. Under § 9-403(2), when a 
financing statement lapses because five years have passed and no continuation statement 
has been filed, judicial lien creditors enjoy a promotion over the de-perfected security 
interest. Under this rule, the trustee has an avoidance action under both the strong arm 
power of § 544(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code and a voidable preference theory under § 
547(b). But§ 9-103(3) has a different rule-if perfection lapses because the collateral has 
been moved to a different state, only buyers obtain a promotion. Lien creditors do not. 
Under this rule, the trustee has no avoidance theory. Again, the UCC provides no clear 
sign as to which lapsarian rule the bankruptcy court should adopt. 
· Nevertheless, it must be recognized that, when a court declares a de-perfected 
purchase money security interest to be void, it implicitly chooses the lapse rule in which 
judicial lien creditors obtain a promotion. 
If an after-acquired property security interest exists to encumber the de-perfected 
security interest in consumer goods, the trustee might have an avoidance theory that 
does not require a choice between the lapse rules. This after-acquired property security 
interest clearly gets a promotion over the de-perfected purchase money security interest, 
no matter which rule is chosen, but this promoted security interest is likely to be a void-
able preference. This avoided security interest is preserved for the benefit of the bank-
rupt estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). The trustee can therefore assert this priority against 
the purchase money security interest. But after-acquired property security interests are 
subject to the rule of§ 9-204(2), which provides: "No security interest attaches under an 
after-acquired property clause to consumer goods . . . when given as additional security 
unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives 
value." Therefore, this theory is most unlikely to occur, so that a choice of a lapse rule 
will usually be necessary. 
142. In re Snipes, 86 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (Kroger, J .). 
1992-93] PURCHASE MONEY 837 
one of the loans is nonpurchase money. 143 Consolidation seems to be 
merely a combination of collateral add-on and debt add-on clauses.144 
The second possible federal interest in the definition of purchase 
money is with regard to purchase money security interests in qualified 
airplanes, vessels and trains. The secured creditors claiming such se-
curity interests are entitled to the privilege of section lllO(a), whereby 
the automatic stay against repossession dissipates after sixty days un-
less the chapter 11 debtor cures all past defaults on the security agree-
ment. But if no purchase money status exists-or if it is forfeit under a 
transformation rule-then the secured party is subject to the usual au-
tomatic stay that all secured parties must live with. m 
According to sectiqn 522(f)(2) "the debtor may avoid the fixing of 
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such 
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been enti-
143. Id; contra, Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797, 
801 (3d Cir. 1984) (Weis, J.) . 
144. Professor Mark Wessman makes the useful point that the dual status rule is 
simply a qualification of the transformation rule, not its polar opposite: 
Both rules are based on the same fundamental assumption that purchase 
money debt and collateral can never really be consolidated and cross-collater-
alized. Even if the debt from two successive purchases is consolidated as a 
matter of accounting, it is assumed that the separate "prices" of each item 
survive and can be (indeed must be) correlated to separate items of collateral. 
This is true even if, as in the consumer add-on cases, each successive debt and 
each item of collateral would have purchase money status considered in isola-
tion. The difference between the strict version of the transformation rule and 
the dual status rule is only in the harshness of the penalty imposed if the cred-
itor tries to accomplish anything more complex than a series of discrete, unre-
lated, and successive purchase money transactions. Under the transformation 
rule, purchase money status is Jost entirely. Under the dual status rule, the loss 
of purchase money status may be partial only if the creditor has a payment 
allocation method which enables him to isolate the remaining "price" of partic-
ular items of collateral. The dual status rule is thus merely a less punitive 
qualification of the transformation rule, not a rule built on a different 
foundation. 
Wessman, supra _note 2, at 1313. 
145. This state of affairs is not entirely rational. Lessees have rights under § 
lll0(a), whether they originally supplied the equipment in purchase money style or 
whether they are simply financiers who fancy leases more than security interests. In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J.); General Elec. Credit 
Corp. v. Pan Am Corp. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 124 B.R. 960, 963 n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1991), aff'd, 125 B.R. 372 (S.D.N.Y.) (Musakey, J.), aff'd, 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2248 (1991); Braniff, Inc. v. Toren (In re Braniff. Inc.), 
110 B.R. 980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (Corcoran, J.). Why lessees of all stripes should be 
privileged but nonpurchase money secured parties should be left out of § lll0(a) can 
only be explained by the unaccepting continuance of uncritical distinctions drawn by the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
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tied under subsection (b) of this section .... "148 If a state proclaims 
that exemptions extend only so far as the debtor equity in collateral, it 
arguably follows that the security interest is not subject to section 
522(f)(2) avoidance, because the exemption stops just short of the se-
curity interest. And if the security interest does not encumber exempt 
property, then section 522(f)(2) cannot obliterate the security interest 
after all. 147 
Initially, some courts so ruled, and as a result, when a state ex-
emption law was felicitously worded, secured parties preserved their 
non purchase money security interests. 148 In support of this view is the 
fact that section 522(f)(2) allows lien avoidance "to the extent that 
such lien impairs an exemption." Yet if the security interest by defini-
tion does not encroach on the exemption, then there can be no lien 
avoidance. 
Other courts thought that if any part of the item is exemptible-if 
the debtor equity may be reserved by the debtor-then any security 
interest on the item may be destroyed under section 522(f)(2).149 
This matter has now been settled by the Supreme Court in favor 
of this latter view whereby security interests can be destroyed regard-
less of the content of state exemption law. The issue, however, was 
addressed in the guise of a judicial lien on exempt property, something 
covered by section 522(f)(l), not section 522(f)(2). Nevertheless, the 
reasoning is fully applicable for both parts of section 522(f)(2).150 
146. 11 u.s.c. §522(0(2) (1988). 
147. Apparently, some states even amended their exemption statutes to help se-
cured parties achieve this implication. James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522's Opt-Out 
Clause: Debtdr's Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 25-26. 
148. Fox v. ITT Fin. Servs., 902 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1990) (Garwood, J.) (Mississippi 
law); In re Bessent, 831 F.2d 82, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J.) (Louisiana); In re 
Spears, 744 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); In re Allen, 725 F.2d 290, 292-93 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (Politz, J.) (Texas); In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983) (Merritt, J .), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 928 (1984) (Tennessee and Georgia). For a rare case of rebellion by a 
lower court against the governing authorities in the Fifth Circuit, see In re Thompson, 
59 B.R. 690, 692 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). Here Judge Glen Ayers wrote, "[w)ere the 
Fifth Circuit confronted with Allen today, it would almost certainly not render the same 
decision." Id. at 695. The prediction proved incorrect, as the Fifth Circuit has reiterated 
its position at least twice since Allen. 
149. Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(Brorby, J.); In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985) (Kravitch, J .); In re Thompson, 
750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1984) (Lay, J.); In re Maddox, 713 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam). 
150. In re Wink, 137 B.R. 297, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1992) (Utschig, J .); In re 
Kelly, 133 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (McGuire, J.). 
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In Owen v. Owen, 161 an ex-wife had a judgment against her ex-
husband when the latter bought a condominium apartment. The judi-
cial lien attached to the condo upon acquisition pursuant to standard 
after-acquired property assumptions. The next year, Florida allowed 
condos to be exempt property, but it preserved any pre-existing judi-
cial lien. 
According to section 522(f)(l): 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor 
may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in 
property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to 
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection 
(b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien . ... 112 
The debtor therefore reasoned that the judicial lien on the exempt 
property should be avoided. The ex-wife thought that the judicial lien 
did not impair the exemption, within the meaning of section 522(f), 
and so the lien should stand. 
Justice Antonin Scalia saw some merit in the ex-wife's argument, 
but he worried about its consistency with what he termed a "uniform 
practice of bankruptcy courts"163 regarding the meaning of the federal 
exemptions that most states have opted out of. This federal rule allows 
exemption of "the debtor's interest" in the listed items. 1114 This implies 
that only debtor equity is exempt. If the ex-wife were right, section 
522(f) could never invalidate an effective judicial lien (or perfected se-
curity interest) on a federally exempt item of property. Bankruptcy 
courts have routinely allowed section 522(f) to avoid otherwise valid 
liens on federally exempt items. 
151. 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991). 
152. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
153. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1836. 
154. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). 
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Given this attitude toward federal exemptions, 11111 Scalia saw no 
valid reason to distinguish the state-law exemptions, iae and so in the 
interest of uniformity, he ruled that otherwise valid liens could be de-
stroyed under section 522(f). 
Scalia also made a great deal out of the language italicized above 
("would have , been"). "To determine the application of § 522(f)," 
Scalia wrote, courts interpreting the federal exemption "ask not 
whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is in fact 
entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption to which he wou'ld have 
been entitled but for the lien interest itself."1117 That is, the debtor 
gets, not the exemptions to which she is entitled, but to what she 
155, This attitude, by the way, seems entirely correct, The idea of the federal ex-
emptions was that many states had not amended their debtor-creditor laws since the 
nineteenth century, Hence, many of the exemptions were pitiful by modern standards, 
Congress allowed debtors to have potentially better federal exemptions, but if states con-
sciously thought highly enough of their own systems, they could "opt out" of the federal 
system in favor of exclusive state governance, 11 U,S,C, § 522(b) (1988), 
In a state like Connecticut, for example, debtors have no real estate exemption 
whatever, Connecticut debtors may choose the federal real estate exemption, which pro-
tects debtors up to $7,500, If nonvoidable judicial liens. in Connecticut already encum-
bered the real estate, however, then Connecticut debtors would gain nothing from the 
federal exemption, Owen, 111 S, Ct, at 1836; C, Robert Morris, Bankruptcy Fantasy: 
The Site of Missing Words and the Order of Illusory Events, 45 ARK, L, REV, 265, 272-
73 (1992). It was necessary, then, that Connecticut judicial liens be destroyed by § 
522(0(1), so that the federal exemptions might do a Connecticut debtor some good. Rob-
ert H. Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial Liens that Impair Exemptions in Bankruptcy: 
The Workings of 11 U.S .C. § 522(f)(I) , 63 AM. BANKR. L,J. 375, 387-88 & n,85 (1989) 
(discussing New York's bankruptcy-only exemptions, to which judicial liens might 
attach). 
156. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1837-38. One commentator suggests that, by definition, 
judicial liens would never exist on property exempt under state law. Hence, § 522(0 
must exist solely to clear federally exempt property of state judicial liens. Lawrence 
Kalevitch, Lien Avoidance on Exemptions: The False Controversy Over Opt-Out, 44 
OKLA. L. REv. 443, 451-53 (1991), There are three problems with this view. First, § 522(0 
applies to any exemption claimed under § 522(b), which would include either state or 
federal exemptions. The rule for one would seem to be the rule for the other. Second, it 
is incorrect that judicial liens cannot exist under state law on exempt property. States 
have now created "bankruptcy-only" exemptions which could sustain state judicial liens. 
Bowmar, supra note 155, at 388. Third, whatever reasoning is adopted for § 522(0(1) 
(judicial liens) must also apply for § 522(0(2) (nonpurchase money security interests on 
certain exempt property), Article 9 security interests routinely exist on exempt property. 
Yet § 522(0(2) would kill off the security interests on the federal exemptions. This im-
plies that § 522(0 has a purpose beyond simply clearing property of judicial liens so that 
the federal exemptions could have meaning in the few states that have not opted out. 
157, Owen, 111 S. Ct, at 1836-37 (footnote omitted and emphasis in original); see 
also Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 336-37 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(Brorby, J ,). 
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would have been entitled. 1118 This past subjunctive tense demands that 
there be a "but for" against which the debtor is protected. Now one 
"but for" might be found in the opening words of section 
522(0-"[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions." This harmless 
"but for" would allow the ex-wife's judicial lien to survive. 
Scalia rejected this argument, because the opening word "notwith-
standing" had already dispensed with the waiver. Given that the 
waiver had been neutralized, the "but-for" of the "would have been" 
must be something other than the waiver. 1118 Furthermore, Scalia 
thought, the destruction of waivers in section 522(f) is merely an 
aside.180 The main point of section 522(f) is to destroy liens, suggesting 
that the "but for" must be aimed at the lien, not the waiver of 
exemption. 181 
Thus, the Florida judicial lien was destroyed by section 522(f)(l), 
and, once again, an ex-husband was allowed to escape the obligations 
to his family that law and nature demand. Now this reasoning directly 
affects Article 9 security interests under section 522(f)(2). Hence, it 
must be viewed as settled that, whatever the content of local state ex-
emption law, section 522(0(2) is competent to destroy any otherwise 
valid security interest on the specific items listed under section 
522(f)(2). 181 
For present purposes, the moral of Owen v. Owen is that the states 
may not nullify section 522(f)(2) by specifying that only debtor equity 
158. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1837. 
159. "The only other conceivable possibility is but for a waiver-harking back to 
the beginning phrase of § 522(0 . . . . The use of contrary-to-fact construction after a 
'notwithstanding' phrase is not, however, common usage, if even permissible." Id. 
160. Waivers are targeted quite directly in § 522(e), so that the damage done to 
waivers in § 522(0 can fairly be called "an aside." Id. 
161. One argument not available to Justice Scalia, who interpreted § 522(0(1), ap-
plies to § 522(0(2)-the creation of a security interest in exempt property can be viewed 
as a waiver of the exemption; hence, § 522(0(2) should destroy security interests "not-
withstanding waiver," to quote the opening words of § 522(0. See In re MacManus, 681 
F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1982) (Dyer, J., dissenting). 
162. One aspect of the case, emphasized in Justice Stevens' dissent, is that Mr. 
Owens' condo became exempt only after Mrs. Owens' judicial lien encumbered the asset. 
Therefore, it ought to be possible in general to disencumber collateral that was never 
exempt by rendering it exempt. For example, suppose a debtor brings home encumbered 
office furniture, thereby rendering the furniture exempt. The security interest on that 
office furniture should effectively disappear, so long as it was not of the purchase money 
variety. In re Hilary, 76 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (Kresse!, J.) (violin used for 
business could be converted into home instrument, though exemption disallowed for 
other reasons); but see In re Goodwin, 133 B.R. 141, 144 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) 
(Vandivier, J.) (because secured party relied on representation that furniture was for 
office, de_btor estopped later to claim it was household furnishings). 
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in collateral is exempt. Rather, the states may only identify whole 
things-not parts of things-that can be exempted. If a security inter-
est encumbers the whole of the exempt thing, that security interest can 
be avoided, no matter what the states say. 
Now if this limitation exists on the definition of what may be ex-
empt property, it is also possible that restrictions might exist on how a 
state might define "purchase money." 
At some level these restrictions must exist. Suppose, for example, 
that the Uniform Commissioners, taking offense at section 522(f)(2) 
and its implicit criticism of their wares, amended Article 9 to read: "All 
security interests granted for any purpose will be deemed purchase 
money security interests for all purposes." This provision would 
equally eliminate section 522(f)(2) from existence, something Owen v. 
Owen does not allow.188 Therefore, it follows that "purchase money," 
to some extent, must have a purely federal element. 
Nevertheless, short of deliberate attempts to subvert section 
522(f)(2), a federal court might still give deference to state-created def-
initions of purchase money security interests. That is, federal law 
would define the core concept of purchase money, to borrow H.L.A. 
Hart's metaphor, while the states could legislate in the unessential pe-
riphery. If so, it might be open for the revisers of Article 9 to consider 
whether the transformation or the dual status rule is more desirable in 
consumer cases. Surely this is a peripheral question that does not 
strike at the core of purchase moneyhood. m 
In def erring in part but not in whole, bankruptcy courts might re-
member that the two relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions-section 
522(f)(2) and section lllO(a)-do not involve priorities between credi-
tors but rather relations between the secured party and the debtor 
only. Other creditors are relatively indifferent to whether a purchase 
money lender prevails under section 522(f)(2) or section lllO(a). In 
contrast, the purchase money questions under Article 9 go to priority 
between creditors only.166 Thus, the definitions under the Bankruptcy 
Code might be heavily influenced by the federal policy of "fresh start" 
163. But see Associates Fin. v. Conn (In re Conn), 16 B.R. 454, 456 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1982) (viewing the question as one of purely state law). 
164. On this question Professor Robert Lloyd suggests that the federal courts 
might defer to the UCC definitions but as a federal matter. Nonuniform state definitions 
would then be excluded. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 77-79. In any case, Lloyd recommends 
that "if the courts wish to continue to further the debtor protection policies of section 
522(f) in cases involving the survival of purchase money status, they should stop muddy-
ing the waters by claiming to be interpreting the UCC. They should admit that they are 
developing a Bankruptcy Code definition .... " Id. at 81. ,~ 
165. Id. at 79. 
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for the debtor, while Article 9 definitions would be entirely indifferent 
to this.'" Such an observation might prevent federal courts from rely-
ing too heavily on Article 9 to solve consumer bankruptcy cases. 
C. Nonuniform Legislation 
Two states have attempted to overturn the potentially federal 
transformation rule by adding nonuniform language to section 9-107. 
According to section 47-9-107(c) of the Tennessee Code, a security in-
terest is purchase money to the extent it is · 
(c) under subsections (a) and (b), a purchase money secur-
ity interest upon any unpaid balance in preexisting collateral 
arising pursuant to a series of purchases or extension of pay-
ment time and terms. Provided, however, that whenever the 
collateral is consumer goods, the creditor retains no purchase 
money security interest in any property as to which he has re-
ceived payments aggregating the amount of the sale price in-
cluding any finance charges attributable thereto. For the 
purposes of this section, in the case of items purchased on dif-
ferent dates, the · first item purchased shall be deemed the first 
paid for, and in the case of items purchased on the same date, 
the lowest priced item shall be deemed first paid for. 187 
The idea of this provision is that "any unpaid balance" from a series of 
purchases is secured by purchase money security interests. iee This 
seems to protect collateral add-on and debt add-on (when the debt is 
itself purchase money debt for new items in a series of purchases), but 
it does not seem to protect debt add-on when nonpurchase money is 
advanced.189 Also, a "first in first out" allocation system for items pur-
chased at different times is imposed. 17° For items purchased at the 
166. Id. at 81. Professor Lloyd reminds us that Article 9 deliberately refuses to 
concern itself with consumer protection. Id. at 74. 
167. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-107(c) (1992). 
168. As the "unpaid balance" will include debt service and other incidentals, it 
could be that Tennessee answers the question left ambiguous in the official ver-
sion-whether "its price" enabling "advances" include such items. Mary Aronov, The 
Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in Commercial 
Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. L. REV. 15, 53 (1985). 
169. Lloyd, supra no_te 3, at 68. 
170. See Michigan Note, supra note 16, at 870 ("The FIFO method, unlike the pro 
rata method, is not unconscionable .... "). 
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same time, wherein the cheapest item is first disencumbered by any 
payment, followed by the second cheapest, and so forth. 171 
Louisiana has a provision that mandates the dual status rule. Ac-
cording to section 10.9-107(b) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes: "The 
fact that the collateral additionally secures other or future indebted-
ness of the debtor as a result of cross collateralization shall not affect 
purchaser [sic] money security interest status." Under this provision, 
even if future nonpurchase money advances are given (debt add-on), 
the original purchase money status continues to have integrity. 
V. REFINANCING AND THE DESTRUCTION OF PURCHASE 
MONEY STATUS 
Debt add-on or collateral add-on was based on the idea that impu-
rities in the relation between claim and collateral might lead to a for-
feiture or at least a limitation on purchase money status. Quite a 
different idea is that refinancing leads to a novation of the old 
purchase money loan in favor of a new nonpurchase money loan. 
Whether an old interest lives on or is destroyed and replaced by 
an entirely new interest is a metaphysical puzzle we have already vis-
ited. The conditional sale, for example, can be viewed either as an old 
ownership interest that continues on as a retained security interest, or 
as a sale that wipes out the former ownership interest, and is replaced 
by an entirely new purchase money security interest. 
The metaphysics of extension versus renewal recently occupied the 
attention of the Supreme Court in Farrey v. Sanderfoot. 171 In this case, 
a divorcing husband and wife had been cotenants of their house. Ac-
cording to the divorce decree, the husband kept the house but owed 
the wife cash to balance out the equal division of the marital estate. 
This amount was secured by the house itself, and the divorce decree 
purported to give the wife a judicial lien on the house. The husband 
then filed for bankruptcy and, claiming the house as exempt property, 
ungallantly sought to destroy his ex-wife's judicial lien under section 
522(f)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code. According to section 522(f)(l): 
171. For a case interpreting Tennessee's nonuniform version of§ 9-107, see In re 
Nolen, 53 B.R. 235 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (Paine, J .) (purchase money security inte'r-
est n_ot subject to transformation rule, thanks to legislation). Professor Robert Lloyd 
complains that this statute does not affect the refinancing cases, where a refinanced loan 
is deemed to extinguish the purchase money loan and replace it with a nonpurchase 
money loan. Lloyd, supra note 3, 68-69. It is still open in Tennessee for a court to find a 
novation and hence extinction of a refinanced purchase m<mey claim. 
172. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991) (White, J.). 
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Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor 
may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in 
property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to 
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection 
(b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien .... 173 
845 
The Supreme Court refused to avoid the judicial lien. According to 
Justice Byron White, the purpose of section 522(f)(l) was to relieve 
debtors who were required to file homestead statements in the real es-
tate records but who had not done so before judicial liens attached. 
Under section 522(f)(l), these judicial liens could be avoided, even if 
the property only became exempt later, thereby tempering the disap-
pointment of a lost race to the courthouse. 174 
Now, given that section 522(f)(l)'s purpose was to avoid a race to 
the courthouse, it followed, by White's logic, that section 522(f) does 
not apply in any circumstance in which the parties would not engage in 
a race to the courthouse. One such instance is when the debtor owns no 
property at all at the time a judgment is rendered against him. In such 
a case, the debtor would not have any reason to race to the courthouse. 
In such circumstances, Congress did not intend for section 522(f) to 
apply. This policy led to an unusual definition of what it means to 
"fix" a lien. According to White: 
Section 522(f)(l) does not state that any fixing of a lien may be 
avoided; instead, it permits avoidance of the "fixing of a lien on 
173. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1988) (emphasis added). 
174. This at least appears to be the race that White deplores. See Farrey, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1830 (describing § 522(f)(l)'s "purpose of preventing a creditor from beating the 
debtor to the courthouse . .. "). Elsewhere, White also deplores a race between creditors 
to get judicial liens, a province of voidable preference law. Id. (describing § 522(f)(l)'s 
role in replacing § 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act). 
White, then, conceives of creditors rushing to the courthouse to get liens in anticipa-
tion of bankruptcy. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1831. This might justify voidable preference 
law, but it cannot suffice to justify § 522(f) . Morris, supra note 155, at 288-89 (criticizing 
Justice White's invocation of voidable preference concepts) . As far as the debtor's ex-
emptions are concerned, the race cannot be conceived as beginning with unsecured credi-
tors wishing for the first time to obtain liens. Creditors cannot have judicial liens on 
demand. They must win judgments, which require notice to the debtor, not to mention 
trials, motions and the like. The debtor can easily beat creditors to the courthouse to 
preserve their homestead if what we have is .creditors starting off from an unsecured 
position hoping to get quick judicial liens. 
Rather, if Congress had in mind the abolition of a race, it must be a race in which 
the debtor has just lost a judgment and has not filed a homestead declaration. It is not 
the creditor who will be rushing to the courthouse but only the debtor. 
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an interest of the debtor." If the fixing took place before the 
debtor acquired that interest, the "fixing" by definition was 
not on the debtor's interest. Nor could the statute apply given 
its purpose of preventing a creditor from beating the debtor to 
the courthouse, since the debtor at no point possessed the in-
terest without the judicial lien. There would be no fixing to 
avoid since the lien was already there. To permit lien avoid-
ance in these circumstances, in fact, would be to allow judicial 
lienholders to be defrauded through the conveyance of an en-
cumbered interest to a prospective debtor. For these reasons, it 
is settled that a debtor cannot use § 522(f)(l) to avoid a lien on 
an interest acquired after the lien attached.1711 
Thus, according to Justice White, section 522(f) can apply only when 
the debtor owns property first and then, subsequently, a lien fixes to 
this property. Where the lien fixes first and the debtor obtains a prop-
erty interest later, section 522(f) cannot have any effect on the lien. 176 
175. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830 (citations omitted). 
176. If this principle is transported to questions of § 522(0(2) , it implies that any 
security interest that "fixes" itself to the debtor's interest at the same time as the debtor 
obtains the property, § 522(0(2) cannot avoid the lien. Such a principle thoroughly dis-
rupts the jurisprudence of § 522(0(2). For example, as we shall see, a great amount of 
effort has been spent on striking down purchase money loans that also have "collateral 
add-on clauses." Courts often insist that only the purest purchase money security inter-
ests are immune from § 522(0(2). This mighty effort is for naught if § 522(0(2) never 
applies in cases of simultaneous attachment. See Morris, supra note 155, at 290-91 (pre-
dicting problems with regard to security interests in after-acquired property). 
Not only will § 522(0(2) be affected, but also other sections that refer to the "fixing" 
of liens. For example, § 545 provides: "The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory 
lien on property of the debtor to the extent that such lien . .. (2) is not perfected . . .. " 
The most impressive statutory lien is the tax lien of the Internal Revenue Service. Sec-
tion 545(2) implies that this lien is void unless the IRS has perfected it prior to bank-
ruptcy. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, on the other hand, implies that unperfected tax liens are 
no good against property the debtor owned at the time the tax lien arose, but the lien is 
completely valid against any property acquired afterwards·. This is so because the un-
perfected IRS tax lien encumbers after-acquired property without being "fixed" 
thereto-surely an absurdity. Also, perfected statutory liens are saved from voidable 
preference liability by§ 547(c)(6), which provides that the trustee may not avoid a trans-
fer "that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 . . .. " 
Justice White's interpretation of "fixing" thus implies that statutory liens on after-ac-
quired property are likely to be voidable preferences, if the debtor has obtained property 
within ninety days of bankruptcy. Morris, supra note 155, at 292. On the other hand, the 
illegitimately saved tax liens are also voidable preferences', at least partially righting a 
wrong that Justice White had perpetrated with regard to § 545(1). 
1992-93] PURCHASE MONEY 847 
This view is nothing but the classic commercial law error that sup-
poses a lien can exist before the debtor has acquired property.177 
Rather, it must be said that the lien on after-acquired property "fixes" 
to the debtor's property precisely the same time or infinitely close after 
the debtor obtains the property.178 Be that as it may, Justice White 
determined that a lien created precisely when the debtor obtains rights 
in the collateral does not "fix" itself to the collateral within the mean-
ing of section 522(f)(l). Nevertheless, as the judicial lien exists, it 
somehow attaches to the house by means other than "fixation." Per-
haps it curls once about the house and falls asleep. 
Justice White's view, no matter how inadequate, does require the 
view that the husband did not "retain" his old cotenancy, to which was 
added the wife's cotenancy, as encumbered by mortgages and the ex-
wife's judicial lien. If the husband "retained" the cotenancy and then 
received extra property, then the judicial lien "fixed" to this cotenancy, 
within White's peculiar definition, and the ex-wife would lose her lien. 
According to White, the ex-husband retained nothing. His old co-
tenancy was extinguished, and he received a new property inter-
est-fee simple absolute, as encumbered by mortgages and the ex-
wife's judicial lien-for the first time out of the divorce decree. So con-
ceived, the husband's equity in the property was created coevally with 
the judicial lien. 
But White saw that it was also quite possible to view the hus-
band's cotenancy as "retained." Justice White sought to defeat this 
reasoning by reading the divorce decree as encumbering-not the hus-
band's preexisting cotenancy-but only the cotenancy conveyed to the 
husband in the divorce decree. Since the judicial lien did not antedate 
the husband's acquisition of this cotenancy, then the judicial lien did 
not "fix" itself to the husband's property and therefore could not be 
avoided.179 This reasoning is fine so long as the wife's claim against her 
former cotenancy is less than the value of the cotenancy. It is unfortu-
nate for the ex-wife if she is undersecured on this reasoning, because 
White implies that the husband's original cotenancy is completely 
unencumbered by his wife's judicial lien-half the victory White strove 
to deny the husband. 
'l 
177. This very error plagued voidable preference law prior to the Bankruptcy Code, 
and so Congress sought to warn against it by enacting § 547(e)(3): "For the purposes of 
this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property 
transferred." For a history, see Irving A. Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as 
Voidable Preferences: Part rl/ The Floating Lien, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1982). 
178. See Morris, suprq note 155, at 302-05. 
179. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1831. 
848 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
Justice White felt that he had avoided the difficult metaphysical 
question whether the husband retained his cotenancy, or whether his 
cotenancy was extinguished and subsequently encumbered. If he had 
to choose, by what method should this choice be governed? Clearly, the 
intent of the divorcing judge who wrote the decree should govern.110 
This is precisely the same metaphysics to which a refinanced 
purchase money security interest is subject. A refinanced security in-
terest could alternatively be viewed as an extension of the old security 
interest or as a newly created security interest, because the earlier 
property rights were entirely extinguished and newly replaced with an 
unrelated security interest in the purchase money collateral. These 
matters should be governed by the intent of the parties, 181 just as the 
judicial decree in Farrey v. Sanderfoot181 was governed by the judge's 
intent. 
Finding the intent of the parties, of course, should not be the same 
as seizing upon flimsy evidence to prove the secured party wanted to 
surrender an important commercial advantage. Thus, in an early case 
finding that refinancing destroys purchase money status, Judge James 
Wolfe, in In re Jones, 188 ruled that new promissory notes were a new 
loan that did not "enable" the debtor to obtain new collateral. The old 
purchase money security interest had therefore been extinguished and 
replaced with a new nonpurchase money security interest which was 
fully avoidable under section 522(f)(2).184 Other cases agree that refi-
nancing conclusively proves th 1t the purchase money lender intended 
180. Id. at 1832 (interpreting what the divorce decree purported to achieve). 
181. In Georgia, some state cases have held the refinancing constitutes a new obli-
gation regardless of the parties' intent. Knight v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 260 
S.E.2d 511, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (Carley, J.) . 
182. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991) (White, J.). 
183. 5 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980). 
184. Id. at 656. Of this case, Professor Lloyd writes that Judge Wolfe "displays a 
misunderstanding of the fundamental relationship between the promissory note and the 
debt it secures. The promissory note is not the debt; it is merely evidence of the debt. If 
the promissory note is cancelled and replaced by a new note, the debt remains un-
changed." Lloyd, supra note 3, at 58. Professor Lloyd's criticism does not exactly follow. 
If indeed the promissory note is evidence of the debt, then the new note might be evi-
dence of a new debt, in which case the old purchase money status has disappeared. Nev-
ertheless, it might be weak or misleading evidence, and if that is what Professor Lloyd 
means, he is undoubtedly correct. 
In support of his proposition (in so far as it applies to negotiable instruments), 
Lloyd cites UCC § 3-802(1) (1972), which provides that "unless otherwise agreed where 
an instrument is taken for any underlying obligation . .. (b) the obligation is suspended 
pro tanto until the instrument is due . . . . If the instrument is dishonored action may be 
maintained on either the instrument or the obligation .. . ' ." Hence Lloyd too thinks 
that whether purchase money priority disappears depends on the intent of the parties. 
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to surrender the earlier purchase money status. 181 Still others have 
seized on casual evidence that supposedly proves the secured party in-
tended to waive a valuable right.188 Different maturity dates187 or inter-
est rates are sometimes said to prove novation.188 But, as Dean 
McLaughlin argues, it is possible to say that the interest rate is part of 
185. Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 801 
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (secured party "unequivocally expressed its intent to make a 
new loan .. . . "); Safeway Fin. Co. v. Ward (In re Ward) , 14 B.R. 549, 552-54 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. 1982) (Bowen, J.); Manuel v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Manuel), 18 B.R. 
403, 405 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981) (Davis, J .); Haus v. Barclays Am. Corp. (In re Haus), 18 
B.R. 413, 416-17 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (Davis, J.); In re Snyder, 16 B.R. 380, 381 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1982) (Gartner, J .); In re Mulculhay, 3 B.R. 454, 456-57 (Bankr. D. Ind. 1980) 
(Bayt, J.). 
In the early days of the Bankruptcy Code, it was held that § 522(0(2) applied only 
to security interests created after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. United States 
v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.). Many cases therefore 
involved whether a refinancing precode security interest became a postcode security in-
terest by virtue of the refinancing. This determination involved precisely the same issues 
of novation and intent. Stanford Note, supra note 16, at 1147-48 & nn.56, 59. 
186. In re Calloway, 17 B.R. 212, 214-15 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Bland, J.) (new 
agreement made no reference to old agreement); Johnson v. Citizens' Discount Loan & 
Sav. Co. (In re Johnson), 15 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (Stewart, J.) (loan 
records maintained by secured party seemed consistent with novation); In re Jones, 5 
B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) (Wolfe, J .). 
Judge Arthur Votolato seems to specialize in discovering that secured parties have 
intended to waive their purchase money status, thereby facilitating debtor avoidance 
under § 522(0(2). In In re Adoptante, 140 B.R. 940 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992), the lender 
extended purchase money credit and then extended an additional amount for nonpur-
chase money purposes. Declining to decide whether to follow the transformation or dual 
status rule, Judge Votolato declared the lender intended to forfeit its earlier purchase 
money status. As evidence of this self-destructive intent, Judge Votolato could cite the 
failure to append a list of collateral to the second security agreement (even though the 
security agreement tellingly referred to an appendix), the failure to check a box on the 
security agreement form indicating that a security interest was being granted (though 
the agreement elsewhere made it clear that security interests were intended), the failure 
to indicate in the agreement the replacement value of the purchase money collateral, and 
the filing of a UCC-1. Judge Votolato noted this last piece of evidence was especially 
revealing, as a purchase money secured party need not file at all with regard to consume.r 
goods (though a filing is necessary to prevent free-and-clear sales to other consumer buy-
ers). U.C.C. § 9-307(2). Now all of this evidence was flimsy at best, to put it mildly. One 
wonders whether Votolato was truly interested in the actual intent of the secured party, 
or whether Judge Votolato simply wished to trip up secured parties by setting drafting 
burdens just beyond the reach of the purchase money lender at hand. 
For a similar case, see In re Smiley, 84 B.R. 6 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988) (Votolato, J.) 
(secured party in second loan forgot to indicate that the security interest from the first 
loan continued and hence it was waived altogether). 
187. Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 801 
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
188. Id.; In re Ashworth, 16 B.R. 645, 647 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (Ashland, J .). 
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the original price of the item, and the new interest rate could represent 
a new price renegotiated after the fact. Nothing in the UCC prevents 
such ex post adjustment of the original price.188 
Some courts have thought that the presence of a UCC-1 shows an 
intent to waive purchase money priority, because purchase money se-
curity interests in consumer goods need not be filed. 110 That a UCC-1 
should be used against the secured party in finding an intent to waive 
purchase money status is particularly galling. In other contexts, Article 
9 manifests a policy that financing statements should not be consid-
ered admissions against interest.111 In particular, when a consignor or 
lessor files a cautionary financing statement, courts are not permitted 
to draw the inference that the transaction is really a disguised security 
interest.112 Though it is a small matter that will not deter anti-creditor 
judges long, it might nevertheless help secured parties if section 9-408 
were expanded to protect purchase money lenders from the guilty im-
plications of their financing . statements. 
Of the cases that found in refinancing an excuse to destroy 
purchase money priority, Professor Lloyd writes: "Most of the previous 
decisions considering the novation theory were written by bankruptcy 
judges working under the pressure of enormous case loads. These 
judges are not expected to be exerting in important influence on the 
development of the law."183 Nevertheless, appellate judges, in the glori-
ous summer of their leisure, have closely followed the lead of cases 
such as In re Jones. 184 
It is possible, as always, that a secured party genuinely intends to 
weaken her own position and strengthen that of the debtor by destroy-
ing or surrendering her purchase money status. 180 But this self-destruc-
tive intent should be viewed as very rare. Rather, if a court is 
189. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 682-83. See also Fickey v. Bank of Lafayette 
(In re Fickey), 23 B.R. 586, 589-90 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Kelley, J.) (new interest 
rate did not amount to novation); Credithrift of Am. v. Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn), 20 
B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Bland, J .) (same) . 
190. Safeway Fin. Co. v. Ward (In re Ward) , 14 B.R. 549, 552 (S.D. Ga. 1982) 
(Bowen, J .); Johnson v. Citizens' Discount Loan & Savs. Co. (In re Johnson), 15 B.R. 
681, 684 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (Stewart, J.); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1980) (Wolfe, J .); In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243, 247-48 
(Ref. W.D. Mich. 1966) (Nims, J.). 
191. See Stanford Note, supra note 16, at 1173 n.136. 
192. U.C.C. § 9-408 ("filing shall not of itself be a factor in determining whether or 
not the consignment or lease is intended as security.'') . 
193. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 61-62. 
194. Id. at 62. .ii 
195. Hrncirik v. Farmers Nat. Bank (In re Hrncirht-), 138 B.R. 835, 838 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1992) (McGuire, J .). 
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genuinely interested in the secured party's intent on the matter, it 
should entertain a strong presumption that the secured party intended 
to retain its advantage.198 
Nevertheless, even if refinancing of the original loan by the same 
lender is not a novation of the old purchase money priority, third party 
refinancing looks more like nonpurchase money debt.197 Comment 2 to 
section 9-107, you may recall, "excludes from the purchase money cate-
gory any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of . . . 
[an] antecedent debt." Still, the refinancing third party could have 
taken an assignment from the original purchase money lender, 198 pre-
serving the priority and then refinancing as if the third party were the 
original lender. Nevertheless, even here an assignee who refinanced the 
original loan was held to have forfeited its purchase money priority.199 
All of the refinancing cases appear to exalt form over substance. 
Any one of these deals could have been done in a way to preserve 
purchase money status. Indeed, any nonpurchase money security inter-
est can be changed into a purchase money version. For example, the 
new lender could buy the collateral from the old secured party and the 
debtor. Then the new lender "sells" the collateral to the secured party. 
Or, if the refinancing secured party is the same person as the original 
financing party, the refinancing agreement could take the form of a 
foreclosure-sale-plus-repurchase by the debtor.200 
196. Russell v. Associates Fin. Servs. (In re Russell) , 29 B.R. 270, 273-74 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okla. 1983) (Berry, J.) ; Schewe! Furn. Co. v. Goard (In re Goard), 26 B.R. 316, 317 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982) (Reynolds, J.); Stevens v. Associates Fin. Servs., 24 B.R. 536, 
537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (McGrath, J.); In re Georgia, 22 B.R. 31 , 32 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1982) (Perlman, J .); Spector United Employees Credit Union v. Smith, 263 S.E.2d 
319, 321-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (Wells, J.) ("the pre-Code law in North Carolina held 
that an exchange of notes was presumed not to extinguish the underlying obligation un-
less the parties intended that such an extinguishment occur ... . The Code continues 
the same rule") (citations omitted). 
For cases upholding a refinancing purchase money lender, see Billings v. Avco Colo. 
Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 409 (10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J.) (per se rule 
on refinancings would discourage workouts) ; First Nat'!. Bank & Trust Co. v. Daniel, 701 
F.2d 141, 142 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiarn) .; In re Faughn, 69 B.R. 18, 20 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1986) (McDonald, J.); see Billings, 838 F.2d at 408 n.4 (existence of new, higher 
interest rate held irrelevant to intent not to waive purchase money status). 
197. In re Moody, 97 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (Franklin, J.). Neverthe-
less, the assignment per se does not end purchase money status. Credithrift of Arn. v. 
Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn) , 20 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Bland, J .). 
198. Assignments generally do not affect purchase money priority. In re 
Smallwood, 20 B.R. 699 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Bland, J .). 
199. In re Bowen, 87 B,Jl. 70 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (McDonald, J .). 
200. See Stanford Note, supra note 16, at 1166 for more suggestions. 
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Because this is so, courts that have before them a refinanced 
purchase money security interest should undertake a serious attempt 
to find the true intent of the parties, keeping in mind that it is an 
unusual secured party indeed who would be so generous as to give up a 
valuable advantage like purchase money status. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Like many other concepts in Article 9, the concept of purchase 
money is developed well beyond what the words of section 9-107 say. 
Section 9-107 itself is imprecisely written. It is impossible to take that 
provision literally. As we apparently are about to rewrite Article 9 in 
toto, an opportunity exists to sharpen up the language of section 9-107. 
In particular, purchase money should be defined more carefully to in-
clude or exclude incidentals, such as debt service, insurance and the 
like. Some decision should be made about the purchase money secured 
party's collection expenses-whether they should be in or outside of 
purchase money priority. Furthermore, the drafters of the new Article 
9 have an opportunity to influence bankruptcy courts on whether a 
transformation or a dual status rule should be followed with regard to 
purchase money security interests in consumer goods. 
In addition, I have argued that the perfection rules for purchase 
money security interest should be re-examined. There is no particular 
reason why a purchase money secured party should have to file at all 
against after-acquired property lenders, with the possible exception of 
inventory lenders, who supposedly make future advances on the 
strength of inventory on hand. Rather, perfection should be required 
only as against subsequently created security interests-not those that 
were created at the same time as the purchase money security interest 
was created. To the extent Article 9 can make perfection and priority 
less tricky and eccentric, the more populist and accessible the UCC will 
become. 
\ 
